Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Reforming decentralized integrated health care systems: Theory and the case of the Norwegian reform

Contents:

Author Info

  • Pedersen, Kjeld Møller

    ()
    (Department of public health, health economics)

Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    In this essay a conceptual and theoretical scheme for decentralized integrated health care systems of the northern European kind is developed. With small changes it is also applicable to other countries, e.g. Italy, Spain, and Portugal. Three ideas tie together the scheme: modified fiscal federalism, principalagent thinking and the analysis of discrete structural alternatives from new institutional economics. As a special case it encompasses the ideas of planned markets and public competition developed by von Otter and Saltman. The scheme can be used to analyse driving forces behind reforms and prediction of effects. To illustrate the thinking the recent Norwegian reform is put into context, not only geographically but also theoretically. The geographical context is that of Scandinavia and there is a summary of reforms in the Scandinavian countries over the past 20-30 years. The essay thus serves the double purpose of presenting and evaluating the Norwegian reform in a Scandinavian context and to take part in the neglected discipline of developing a theory of health care reform. The Norwegian January 2002 reform is described in some detail. It is a reversal of the Scandinavian model of decentralization and a move towards more centralism. The hospital system was transferred to the state that established five regions with independent (non-political) boards and each region has a number of daughters (hospitals) that have great autonomy with their own boards and are outside the legal restrictions of the public sector. Basically the idea is to mimic the corporate structure of large private companies. The reform is evaluated based on principal-agent thinking and the analysis of discrete structural alternatives. Overall there is no a priori reason to expect large improvements in efficiency – but on the other hand neither should one expect things to get worse. Many effects depend, however, crucially, on (a) the financing system that will be put in place late 2002 or early 2003, and (b) whether or not the political and management culture change as a result of the reform. In the concluding sections possible implications for Denmark and Sweden are discussed.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://www.hero.uio.no/publicat/2002/HERO2002_7.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Oslo University, Health Economics Research Programme in its series HERO On line Working Paper Series with number 2002:7.

    as in new window
    Length: 61 pages
    Date of creation: 29 Jun 2009
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:hhs:oslohe:2002_007

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: HERO / Institute of Health Management and Health Economics P.O. Box 1089 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway
    Phone: 2307 5309
    Fax: 2307 5310
    Email:
    Web page: http://www.hero.uio.no/eng.html
    More information through EDIRC

    Related research

    Keywords: Health care reform; Norway; principal-agents; discrete structural analysis;

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Kornai, Janos, 1986. "The Soft Budget Constraint," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(1), pages 3-30.
    2. Chalkley, Martin & Malcomson, James M, 1998. "Contracting for Health Services with Unmonitored Quality," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(449), pages 1093-1110, July.
    3. Gerdtham, Ulf-G. & Löthgren, Mickael & Tambour, Magnus & Rehnberg, Clas, 1998. "Internal Markets and Health Care Efficiency: A Multiple-Output Stochastic Frontier Analysis," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 222, Stockholm School of Economics.
    4. Elias Mossialos, 1997. "Citizens' Views on Health Care Systems in the 15 Member States of The European Union," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 6(2), pages 109-116.
    5. Wallace E. Oates, 1999. "An Essay on Fiscal Federalism," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(3), pages 1120-1149, September.
    6. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, December.
    7. Chalkley, M. & Malcomson, J.M., 1996. "Contracts for National Health Service," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9641, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
    8. Chalkley, Martin & Malcomson, James M, 1996. "Contracts for the National Health Service," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(439), pages 1691-1701, November.
    9. Hammer, Michael & Champy, James, 1993. "Reengineering the corporation: A manifesto for business revolution," Business Horizons, Elsevier, vol. 36(5), pages 90-91.
    10. Kutzin, Joseph, 2001. "A descriptive framework for country-level analysis of health care financing arrangements," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 171-204, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:oslohe:2002_007. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Anbjørg Kolaas).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.