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Health Insurance: Treatment vs. Compensation

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Author Info

  • Asheim, Geir

    ()
    (Department of Economics)

  • Nilssen, Tore

    ()
    (Department of Economics)

  • Emblem, Anne Wenche

    ()
    (Agder University)

Abstract

In this paper, we view health insurance as a combined hedge against the two consequences of falling ill: treatment expenditures and loss in income. We discuss how an individual’s ability when healthy affects her decision on whether to buy health insurance with treatment to full recovery if ill or with partial treatment combined with cash compensation for the resulting loss in income. We find that a highability individual demands full recovery and is fully insured, while a low-ability individual demands partial treatment and cash compensation and is only partly insured.

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File URL: http://www.hero.uio.no/publicat/2001/HERO2001_1.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Oslo University, Health Economics Research Programme in its series HERO On line Working Paper Series with number 2001:1.

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Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: 30 Jun 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:oslohe:2001_001

Contact details of provider:
Postal: HERO / Institute of Health Management and Health Economics P.O. Box 1089 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway
Phone: 2307 5309
Fax: 2307 5310
Email:
Web page: http://www.hero.uio.no/eng.html
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Keywords: Health Insurance; Treatment; Compensation;

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References

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  1. Byrne, Margaret M. & Thompson, Peter, 2000. "Death and dignity: Terminal illness and the market for non-treatment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 263-294, May.
  2. Robert F. Graboyes, 2000. "Our money or your life : indemnities vs. deductibles in health insurance," Working Paper 00-04, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
  3. Zeckhauser, Richard, 1970. "Medical insurance: A case study of the tradeoff between risk spreading and appropriate incentives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 10-26, March.
  4. Haveman, Robert & Wolfe, Barbara, 2000. "The economics of disability and disability policy," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 18, pages 995-1051 Elsevier.
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Cited by:
  1. Asheim, Geir B. & Nilssen, Tore & Emblem, Anne Wenche, 2009. "Deductibles in Health Insurance: Pay or Pain?," HERO On line Working Paper Series 2002:13, Oslo University, Health Economics Research Programme.
  2. Anne Emblem, 2002. "Redistribution at the Hospital," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 9(4), pages 367-378, August.

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