Health Insurance: Treatment vs. Compensation
AbstractIn this paper, we view health insurance as a combined hedge against the two consequences of falling ill: treatment expenditures and loss in income. We discuss how an individual’s ability when healthy affects her decision on whether to buy health insurance with treatment to full recovery if ill or with partial treatment combined with cash compensation for the resulting loss in income. We find that a highability individual demands full recovery and is fully insured, while a low-ability individual demands partial treatment and cash compensation and is only partly insured.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Oslo University, Health Economics Research Programme in its series HERO On line Working Paper Series with number 2001:1.
Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: 30 Jun 2009
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: HERO / Institute of Health Management and Health Economics P.O. Box 1089 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway
Phone: 2307 5309
Fax: 2307 5310
Web page: http://www.hero.uio.no/eng.html
More information through EDIRC
Health Insurance; Treatment; Compensation;
Other versions of this item:
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies
- I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-07-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-HEA-2009-07-11 (Health Economics)
- NEP-IAS-2009-07-11 (Insurance Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Asheim, Geir B. & Emblem , Anne Wenche & Nilssen, Tore, 2003.
"Deductibles in Health Insurances: Pay or Pain?,"
13/2002, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- Anne Emblem, 2002. "Redistribution at the Hospital," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 9(4), pages 367-378, August.
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