We study a health-insurance market where individuals are o.ered coverage against both medical expenditures and losses in income. Individuals vary in their level of innate ability. If there is private information about the probability of illness and an individual’s innate ability is su.ciently low, we find that competitive insurance contracts yield screening partly in the form of co-payment, i.e., a deductible in pay, and partly in the form of reduced medical treatment, i.e., a deductible in pain.
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Oslo University, Department of Economics in its series Memorandum with number
13/2002.
Length: 17 pages Date of creation: 17 Jun 2003 Date of revision: Publication status: Published in International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics, 2003, pages 253-266. Handle: RePEc:hhs:osloec:2002_013
Find related papers by JEL classification: D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
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