Deductibles in Health Insurances: Pay or Pain?
AbstractWe study a health-insurance market where individuals are o.ered coverage against both medical expenditures and losses in income. Individuals vary in their level of innate ability. If there is private information about the probability of illness and an individual’s innate ability is su.ciently low, we find that competitive insurance contracts yield screening partly in the form of co-payment, i.e., a deductible in pay, and partly in the form of reduced medical treatment, i.e., a deductible in pain.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Oslo University, Department of Economics in its series Memorandum with number 13/2002.
Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: 17 Jun 2003
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics, 2003, pages 253-266.
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, University of Oslo, P.O Box 1095 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway
Phone: 22 85 51 27
Fax: 22 85 50 35
Web page: http://www.oekonomi.uio.no/indexe.html
More information through EDIRC
health insurance; adverse selection; deductibles;
Other versions of this item:
- Asheim, Geir B. & Nilssen, Tore & Emblem, Anne Wenche, 2009. "Deductibles in Health Insurance: Pay or Pain?," HERO On line Working Paper Series, Oslo University, Health Economics Research Programme 2002:13, Oslo University, Health Economics Research Programme.
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Asheim, Geir & Nilssen, Tore & Emblem, Anne Wenche, 2009.
"Health Insurance: Treatment vs. Compensation,"
HERO On line Working Paper Series, Oslo University, Health Economics Research Programme
2001:1, Oslo University, Health Economics Research Programme.
- Asheim,G.B. & Emblem,A.W. & Nilssen,T., 2000. "Health insurance : treatment vs. compensation," Memorandum, Oslo University, Department of Economics 40/2000, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- Frech, H. III, 1994. "State-dependent utility and the tort system as insurance: Strict liability versus negligence," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 261-271, September.
- Karolin Becker & Peter Zweifel, 2005. "Cost Sharing in Health Insurance: An Instrument for Risk Selection?," SOI - Working Papers 0513, Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich.
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