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Deductibles in Health Insurance: Pay or Pain?

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Author Info

  • Asheim, Geir B.

    ()
    (Department of Economics)

  • Nilssen, Tore

    ()
    (Department of Economics)

  • Emblem, Anne Wenche

    ()
    (School of Management)

Abstract

We study a health-insurance market where individuals are offered coverage against both medical expenditures and losses in income. Individuals vary in their level of innate ability. If there is private information about the probability of illness and an individual’s innate ability is sufficiently low, we find that competitive insurance contracts yield screening partly in the form of co-payment, i.e., a deductible in pay, and partly in the form of reduced medical treatment, i.e., a deductible in pain.

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File URL: http://www.hero.uio.no/publicat/2002/HERO2002_13.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Oslo University, Health Economics Research Programme in its series HERO On line Working Paper Series with number 2002:13.

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Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: 29 Jun 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:oslohe:2002_013

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Postal: HERO / Institute of Health Management and Health Economics P.O. Box 1089 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway
Phone: 2307 5309
Fax: 2307 5310
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Web page: http://www.hero.uio.no/eng.html
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Keywords: Health insurance; adverse selection; deductibles;

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References

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  1. Asheim,G.B. & Emblem,A.W. & Nilssen,T., 2000. "Health insurance : treatment vs. compensation," Memorandum 40/2000, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  2. Frech, H. III, 1994. "State-dependent utility and the tort system as insurance: Strict liability versus negligence," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 261-271, September.
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Cited by:
  1. Karolin Becker & Peter Zweifel, 2005. "Cost Sharing in Health Insurance: An Instrument for Risk Selection?," SOI - Working Papers 0513, Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich.

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