We study a health-insurance market where individuals are offered coverage against both medical expenditures and losses in income. Individuals vary in their level of innate ability. If there is private information about the probability of illness and an individual’s innate ability is sufficiently low, we find that competitive insurance contracts yield screening partly in the form of co-payment, i.e., a deductible in pay, and partly in the form of reduced medical treatment, i.e., a deductible in pain.
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Paper provided by Oslo University, Health Economics Research Programme in its series HERO On line Working Paper Series with number
2002:13.
Length: 17 pages Date of creation: 29 Jun 2009 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:hhs:oslohe:2002_013
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Find related papers by JEL classification: D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
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