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Voces Populi and the Art of Listening

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  • Stensholt, Eivind

    ()
    (Dept. of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration)

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    Abstract

    The strategy most damaging to many preferential election methods is to give insincerely low rank to the main opponent of one’s favorite candidate. Theorem 1 determines the 3-candidate Condorcet method that minimizes the number of noncyclic profiles allowing this strategy. Theorems 2, 3, and 4 establish conditions for an anonymous and neutral 3-candidate single-seat election to be monotonic and still avoid this strategy completely. Plurality elections combine these properties; among the others "conditional IRV" gives the strongest challenge to the plurality winner. Conditional IRV is extended to any number of candidates. Theorem 5 is an impossibility of Gibbard-Satterthwaite type, describing 3 specific strategies that cannot all be avoided in meaningful anonymous and neutral elections.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Department of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 2008/10.

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    Length: 40 pages
    Date of creation: 12 Jun 2008
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:hhs:nhhfms:2008_010

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    Keywords: Preferential Election methods; Plurality Election methods;

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    1. Sen, Amartya K, 1979. "Personal Utilities and Public Judgements: Or What's Wrong with Welfare Economics?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 89(355), pages 537-58, September.
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