Can Mandated Political Representation Increase Policy Influence for Disadvantaged Minorities? Theory and Evidence from India
AbstractA basic premise of representative democracy is that all those subject to policy should have a voice in its making. However, policies enacted by electorally accountable governments often fail to reflect the interests of disadvantaged minorities. This paper exploits the institutional features of political reservation, as practiced in Indian states, to examine the role of mandated political representation in providing disadvantaged groups influence over policy-making. I find that political reservation has increased transfers to groups which benefit from the mandate. This finding also suggests that complete policy commitment may be absent in democracies, as is found in this case. (JEL D72, D78, H11, H50)
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 93 (2003)
Issue (Month): 4 (September)
Other versions of this item:
- Rohini Pande, 2002. "Can mandated political representation increase policy influence for disadvantaged minorities? Theory and evidence from India," Discussion Papers 0102-62, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General
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