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Going from Theory to Practice: The Mixed Success of Approval Voting

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Author Info
Brams, S.J.
Fishburn, P.C.

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Abstract

Approval voting (AV) is a voting system in which voters can vote for, or approve of, as many candidates as they like in multicandidate elections. In 1987 and 1988, four scientific and engineering societies, collectively comprising several hundred thousand members, used AV for the first time. Since then, about half a dozen other societies have adopted AV. Usually its adoption was seriously debated, but other times pragmatic or political considerations proved decisive in its selection. While AV has an ancient pedigree, its recent history is the focus of this paper. Ballot data from some of the societies that adopted AV are used to compare theoretical results with experience, including the nature of voting under AV and the kinds of candidates that are elected. Although the use of AV is generally considered to have been successful in the societies-living up to the rhetoric of its proponents-AV has been a controversial reform. AV is not currently used in any public elections, despite efforts to institute it, so its success should be judged as mixed. The chief reason for its nonadoption in public elections, and by some societies, seems to be a lack of key "insider" support.

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Paper provided by C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University in its series Working Papers with number 03-06.

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Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: 2003
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Handle: RePEc:cvs:starer:03-06

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Related research
Keywords: APPROVAL VOTING ELECTIONS PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES CONDORCET CANDIDATE.

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
N00 - Economic History - - General - - - General

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Weber, Robert J, 1995. "Approval Voting," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 39-49, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
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  1. Jordi Massó & Marc Vorsatz, 2008. "Weighted approval voting," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 129-146, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Carlos Alós-Ferrer, 2006. "A Simple Characterization of Approval Voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 621-625, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Enriqueta Aragones & Itzhak Gilboa & Andrew Weiss, 2005. "Making Statements and Approval Voting," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1531, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  4. Moreno-Jiménez, José María & Polasek, Wolfgang, 2003. "E-Democracy and Knowledge. A Multicriteria Framework for the New Democratic Era," Economics Series 142, Institute for Advanced Studies. [Downloadable!]
  5. Marc Vorsatz, 2004. "Approval Voting ion Dichotomous Preferences," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 619.04, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Francesco Sinopoli & Bhaskar Dutta & Jean-François Laslier, 2006. "Approval voting: three examples," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 27-38, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Brams, S.J. & Sanver, R.M., 2003. "Voter Sovereignty and Election Outcomes," Working Papers 03-07, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
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