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De la manipulation des elections indirectes

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Author Info
Sebastian Bervoets (CODE – U. Barcelona)
Vincent Merlin (CREM - CNRS)

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Abstract

This paper is devoted to the analysis of two tiers voting rules. First, one candidate is elected in every jurisdiction and next, an aggregation procedure collects the results from the jurisdictions in order to designate the final winner. It appears that whenever individuals are allowed to change jurisdiction when casting their ballot, it is possible that they can manipulate the result of the election, except when the voting rule is the Priority rule, which assigns a priority order to the candidates.

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File URL: http://crem.univ-rennes1.fr/wp/2007/200701.pdf
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Paper provided by Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS in its series Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) with number 200701.

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Date of creation: 2007
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Handle: RePEc:tut:cremwp:200701

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Fishburn, Peter C, 1971. "The Theory of Representative Majority Decision," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 39(2), pages 273-84, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Laffond, Gilbert & Laine, Jean, 2000. "Representation in majority tournaments," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 35-53, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Hartvigsen, David, 2006. "Vote trading in public elections," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 31-48, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Sebastian Bervoets & Vincent Merlin, 2006. "Stability and Manipulation in Representative Democracies," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 669.06, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-13.

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