Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Non-manipulable Assignment of Individuals to Positions Revisited

Contents:

Author Info

  • Andersson, Tommy

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Lund University)

  • Svensson, Lars-Gunnar

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Lund University)

Abstract

This paper investigates an allocation rule that fairly assigns at most one indivisible object and a monetary compensation to each agent, under the restriction that the monetary compensations do not exceed some exogenously given upper bound. A few properties of this allocation rule are stated and the main result demonstrates that the allocation rule is coalitionally strategy-proof.

Download Info

To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Lund University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2006:11.

as in new window
Length: 11 pages
Date of creation: 03 May 2006
Date of revision: 12 Apr 2007
Publication status: Published as Andersson, Tommy and Lars-Gunnar Svensson, 'Non-manipulable Assignment of Individuals to Positions Revisited' in Mathematical Social Sciences, 2008, pages 350-354.
Handle: RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2006_011

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund,Sweden
Phone: +46 +46 222 0000
Fax: +46 +46 2224613
Web page: http://www.nek.lu.se/en
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Indivisible objects; fairness; coalitionally strategy-proofness;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Sun, Ning & Yang, Zaifu, 2003. "A general strategy proof fair allocation mechanism," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 73-79, October.
  2. Alkan, Ahmet & Demange, Gabrielle & Gale, David, 1991. "Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 1023-39, July.
  3. Ning Sun & Zaifu Yang, 2003. "A General Strategy Proof Fair Allocation Mechanism," Working Papers 346, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  4. Tadenuma, Koichi & Thomson, William, 1991. "No-Envy and Consistency in Economies with Indivisible Goods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 59(6), pages 1755-67, November.
  5. Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, 1983. "Large Indivisibles: An Analysis with Respect to Price Equilibrium and Fairness," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 939-54, July.
  6. Demange, Gabrielle & Gale, David, 1985. "The Strategy Structure of Two-sided Matching Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 873-88, July.
  7. Demange, Gabrielle & Gale, David & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1986. "Multi-Item Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 863-72, August.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Andersson, T. & Gudmundsson, J. & Talman, A.J.J. & Yang, Z., 2013. "A Competitive Partnership Formation Process," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 2013-008, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  2. Tommy Andersson & Lars Ehlers & Lars-Gunnar Svensson, 2012. "(Minimally) ?-Incentive Compatible Competitive Equilibria in Economies with Indivisibilities," Cahiers de recherche, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ 04-2012, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  3. Tommy Andersson & Christer Andersson, 2012. "Properties of the DGS-Auction Algorithm," Computational Economics, Society for Computational Economics, Society for Computational Economics, vol. 39(2), pages 113-133, February.
  4. Andersson, Tommy & Svensson, Lars-Gunnar & Ehlers, Lars, 2010. "Budget-Balance, Fairness and Minimal Manipulability," Working Papers, Lund University, Department of Economics 2010:16, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 15 Jan 2013.
  5. Paula Jaramillo, 2012. "Asymmetrically Fair Rules for an Indivisible Good Problem with a Budget Constraint," DOCUMENTOS CEDE, UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE 009425, UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE.
  6. Tommy Andersson & Christer Andersson, 2009. "Solving House Allocation Problems with Risk-Averse Agents," Computational Economics, Society for Computational Economics, Society for Computational Economics, vol. 33(4), pages 389-401, May.
  7. Lars-Gunnar Svensson, 2009. "Coalitional strategy-proofness and fairness," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 227-245, August.
  8. Andersson, Tommy & Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, 2012. "Non-Manipulable House Allocation with Rent Control," Working Papers, Lund University, Department of Economics 2012:18, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 10 Jun 2013.
  9. Andersson, Tommy & Andersson, Christer & Talman, Adolphus Johannes Jan, 2010. "Sets in Excess Demand in Ascending Auctions with Unit-Demand Bidders," Working Papers, Lund University, Department of Economics 2010:15, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 28 Jun 2012.
  10. Tommy Andersson, 2009. "A general strategy-proof fair allocation mechanism revisited," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 29(3), pages 1717-1722.
  11. Andersson, Tommy & Ehlers, Lars & Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, 2012. "Least Manipulable Envy-free Rules in Economies with Indivisibilities," Working Papers, Lund University, Department of Economics 2012:8, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 30 Sep 2013.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2006_011. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (David Edgerton).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.