This paper investigates an allocation rule that fairly assigns at most one indivisible object and a monetary compensation to each agent, under the restriction that the monetary compensations do not exceed some exogenously given upper bound. A few properties of this allocation rule are stated and the main result demonstrates that the allocation rule is coalitionally strategy-proof.
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Paper provided by Lund University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
2006:11.
Length: 11 pages Date of creation: 03 May 2006 Date of revision:
12 Apr 2007 Publication status: Forthcoming in Mathematical Social Sciences, 2008. Handle: RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2006_011
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Demange, Gabrielle & Gale, David & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1986.
"Multi-Item Auctions,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 863-72, August.
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