Weakly Fair Allocations and Strategy-Proofness
AbstractThis paper investigates the problem of allocating two types of indivisible objects among a group of agents when a priority-order must be respected and when only restricted monetary transfers are allowed. Since the existence of a fair allocation not generally is guaranteed due the the restrictions on the money transfers, the concept of fairness is weakened, and a new concept of fairness is introduced. This concept is called weak fairness. We define an allocation rule that implements weakly fair allocations and demonstrate that it is coalitionally strategy-proof. In fact, it is the only coalitionally strategy-proof allocation rule that implements a weakly fair allocation.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Lund University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2007:3.
Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: 21 Feb 2007
Date of revision: 03 Jul 2007
Publication status: Published as Andersson, Tommy and Lars-Gunnar Svensson, 'Weakly Fair Allocations and Strategy-Proofness' in Review of Economic Design, 2008, pages 321-338.
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund,Sweden
Phone: +46 +46 222 0000
Fax: +46 +46 2224613
Web page: http://www.nek.lu.se/en
More information through EDIRC
Indivisibles; fairness; weak fairness; strategy-proofness;
Other versions of this item:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-03-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2007-03-03 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2007-03-03 (Game Theory)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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