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Coalition Strategy-Proofness and Fairness

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  • Svensson, Lars-Gunnar

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Lund University)

Abstract

This paper considers a fair division problem with indivisible objects, like jobs, houses, positions, etc., and one divisible good (money). The individuals consume money and one object each. The class of fair allocation rules that are strategy-proof in the strong sense that no coalition of individuals can improve the allocation for all of its members, by misrepresenting their preferences, is characterized. It turns out that given a regularity condition, the outcome of a fair and coalition strategy-proof allocation rule must maximize the use of money subject to upper quantity bounds determined by the allocation rule. Due to these restrictions the outcomes of the allocation rule are Pareto efficient only for some preference profiles. In a multi-object auction interpretation of the model, the result is a complete characterization of coalition strategy-proof auction rules.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Lund University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2006:10.

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Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: 27 Apr 2006
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published as Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, 'Coalition Strategy-Proofness and Fairness' in Economic Theory, 2009, pages 227-245.
Handle: RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2006_010

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Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund,Sweden
Phone: +46 +46 222 0000
Fax: +46 +46 2224613
Web page: http://www.nek.lu.se/en
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Keywords: Indivisibilities; fairness; coalition strategy-proofness; wages; multiple-object auction;

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References

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  1. Ma, Jinpeng, 1994. "Strategy-Proofness and the Strict Core in a Market with Indivisibilities," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 75-83.
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  4. Andersson, Tommy & Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, 2006. "Non-manipulable Assignment of Individuals to Positions Revisited," Working Papers, Lund University, Department of Economics 2006:11, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 12 Apr 2007.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Serizawa, Shigehiro & Morimoto, Shuhei, 0. "Strategy-proofness and efficiency with non-quasi-linear preferences: a characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, Econometric Society.
  2. Andersson, Tommy & Ehlers, Lars & Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, 2012. "Least Manipulable Envy-free Rules in Economies with Indivisibilities," Working Papers, Lund University, Department of Economics 2012:8, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 30 Sep 2013.
  3. ANDERSSON, Tommy & EHLERS, Lars & SVENSSON, Lars-Gunnar, 2010. "Budget-Balance, Fairness and Minimal Manipulability," Cahiers de recherche, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques 2010-09, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  4. Toyotaka Sakai, 2012. "Fair waste pricing: an axiomatic analysis to the NIMBY problem," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 50(2), pages 499-521, June.
  5. Andersson, Tommy & Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, 2007. "Weakly Fair Allocations and Strategy-Proofness," Working Papers, Lund University, Department of Economics 2007:3, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 03 Jul 2007.
  6. Yuji Fujinaka & Takuma Wakayama, 2011. "Secure implementation in Shapley–Scarf housing markets," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 48(1), pages 147-169, September.
  7. ANDERSSON, Tommy & EHLERS, Lars, 2013. "An algorithm for identifying agent-k-linked allocations in economies with indivisibilities," Cahiers de recherche, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques 2013-12, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  8. Mustafa Afacan, 2013. "The welfare effects of pre-arrangements in matching markets," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 53(1), pages 139-151, May.
  9. Vito Fragnelli & Maria Erminia Marina, 2009. "Strategic Manipulations and Collusions in Knaster Procedure," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 3(2), pages 143-153, July.
  10. Tommy Andersson & Lars Ehlers & Lars-Gunnar Svensson, 2012. "(Minimally) ?-Incentive Compatible Competitive Equilibria in Economies with Indivisibilities," Cahiers de recherche, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ 04-2012, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  11. Paula Jaramillo, 2012. "Asymmetrically Fair Rules for an Indivisible Good Problem with a Budget Constraint," DOCUMENTOS CEDE, UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE 009425, UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE.
  12. Federica Briata & Marco Dall’Aglio & Vito Fragnelli, 2012. "Dynamic Collusion and Collusion Games in Knaster’s Procedure," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 6(3), pages 199-208, October.

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