Intra-Generational Trust - a Semi-Experimental Study of Trust Among Different Generations
AbstractFrom a public database in Sweden we obtained a subject pool consisting of one group 20 years old and another group that was exactly 50 years older. The groups participated in a mail-based trust game. In the trust game the young cohort exhibited significantly more trust than the old cohort did. Furthermore, subjects preferred to place trust in co-players of their own cohort. When amounts sent and proportions returned in the mail-based game are compared with other trust games conducted in standard laboratory environments it is found that the mail-based game does not seem to generate extreme distributions.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Lund University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2002:16.
Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: 31 May 2002
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2005, pages 403-419.
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund,Sweden
Phone: +46 +46 222 0000
Fax: +46 +46 2224613
Web page: http://www.nek.lu.se/en
More information through EDIRC
Trust game; social capital; cohort effect; experiments;
Other versions of this item:
- Holm, Hakan & Nystedt, Paul, 2005. "Intra-generational trust--a semi-experimental study of trust among different generations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 58(3), pages 403-419, November.
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- J10 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - General
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