Deadlines and Distractions
AbstractWe analyze the effect of deadlines on timing of effort when agents are occasionaly distracted. We show that agents precautiously work early when completion of the task is uncertain, but rather likely. Agents who are rarely distracted will always postpone effort since the risk of not completing is small. As a result, increasing the probability of being distracted may even increase the likelihood of meeting the deadline. We further show that introducing the possibility of having the deadline extended may improve the total probability of completing the task without reducing the probability of completing within the originally announced deadline.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Research Institute of Industrial Economics in its series Working Paper Series with number 618.
Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: 13 Apr 2004
Date of revision: 01 Jul 2004
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Phone: +46 8 665 4500
Fax: +46 8 665 4599
Web page: http://www.ifn.se/
More information through EDIRC
Deadlines; Timing of Effort; Optimal Incentives;
Other versions of this item:
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
- M50 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - General
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- Sjögren, Anna & Saez-Marti, Maria, 2004. "On the Timing of Education," Working Paper Series 614, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- Bisin, Alberto & Hyndman, Kyle, 2009.
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16235, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Kyle Hyndman & Alberto Bisin, 2009. "Procrastination, Self-Imposed Deadlines and Other Commitment Devices," Departmental Working Papers 0904, Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics.
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