A Theory of Optimal Deadlines
AbstractThis paper sets forth a model of contracting for delivery in an environment with time to build and adverse selection. The optimal contract is derived and characterized and it takes the form of a deadline contract. Such a contract stipulates a deadline for delivery for each possible type of agent efficiency. The optimal contract induces inefficient delay by using delivery time as a screening device. Furthermore, rents are decreasing in the agent’s efficiency. In meeting the deadline, the agent’s effort is strictly increasing over time, due to discounting. It is shown that increasing the project’s gross value decreases delivery time, while the scale or difficulty of the project decreases it. Last, it is shown that the agent’s rents are increasing in both project difficulty and gross project value.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem in its series Discussion Paper Series with number dp357.
Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2003
Date of revision:
deadlines; delivery time; time to build; adverse selection;
Other versions of this item:
- L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
- L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-05-09 (All new papers)
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