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A Procedure for Testing the Signalling Hypothesis

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  • Albrecht, James W.

    (Columbia University)

Abstract

This paper develops a procedure for testing the signaling hypothesis as advanced by Spence, et. al. The approach used is to examine directly the question of whether employers use education for purely informational purposes in their hiring decisions. An application of the method to a recruitment by the Swedish auto manufacturer Volvo is presented.

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File URL: http://www.ifn.se/wfiles/wp/wp029.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Research Institute of Industrial Economics in its series Working Paper Series with number 29.

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Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: Jul 1980
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0029

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Postal: Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Box 55665, SE-102 15 Stockholm, Sweden
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Fax: +46 8 665 4599
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Web page: http://www.ifn.se/
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Related research

Keywords: Employers; Education; Recruitment; Manufacturing;

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References

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  1. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1973. "The Theory of 'Screening', Education, and the Distribution of Income," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 354, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  2. Taubman, Paul J & Wales, Terence J, 1973. "Higher Education, Mental Ability, and Screening," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(1), pages 28-55, Jan.-Feb..
  3. Riley, John G, 1979. "Testing the Educational Screening Hypothesis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(5), pages S227-52, October.
  4. Arrow, Kenneth J., 1973. "Higher education as a filter," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 193-216, July.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Joseph G. Altonji & Charles R. Pierret, 1997. "Employer Learning and Statistical Discrimination," NBER Working Papers 6279, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Soumyanetra Munshi, 2014. "Arranged marriage, education and dowry: A Contract-theoretic perspective," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2014-006, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
  3. Farber, Henry S & Gibbons, Robert, 1996. "Learning and Wage Dynamics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 111(4), pages 1007-47, November.
  4. Albrecht, James & van Ours, Jan C., 2001. "Using Employer Hiring Behavior to Test the Educational Signaling Hypothesis," IZA Discussion Papers 399, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  5. Brown, Sarah & Sessions, John G., 1999. "Education and employment status: a test of the strong screening hypothesis in Italy," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 397-404, October.
  6. V. Albouy & C. Tavan, 2007. "Dynamics of Social Inequalities in French Higher Education," Documents de Travail de la DESE - Working Papers of the DESE g2007-06, Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques, DESE.
  7. Strobl, Eric, 2003. "Is Education Used as a Signaling Device for Productivity in Developing Countries? Evidence from Ghana," IZA Discussion Papers 683, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).

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