A Procedure for Testing the Signalling Hypothesis
AbstractThis paper develops a procedure for testing the signaling hypothesis as advanced by Spence, et. al. The approach used is to examine directly the question of whether employers use education for purely informational purposes in their hiring decisions. An application of the method to a recruitment by the Swedish auto manufacturer Volvo is presented.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Research Institute of Industrial Economics in its series Working Paper Series with number 29.
Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: Jul 1980
Date of revision:
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Postal: Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Box 55665, SE-102 15 Stockholm, Sweden
Phone: +46 8 665 4500
Fax: +46 8 665 4599
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More information through EDIRC
Employers; Education; Recruitment; Manufacturing;
Other versions of this item:
- E24 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution
- I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General
- L60 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - General
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