Forestland Reform in China: What do the Farmers Want? A Choice Experiment on Farmers’ Property Rights Preferences
AbstractVarious decentralization experiments are currently underway in the Chinese forestry sector. However, a key question often ignored by researchers and policy makers is what farmers really want from reform. This paper addresses this question using a survey-based choice experiment. We investigated farmers’ preferences for various property-rights attributes of a forestland contract. We found that farmers are highly concerned with what types of rights a contract provides. Reducing perceived risks of contract termination and introducing a priority right in the renewal of an old contract significantly increase farmers’ marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) for a forest contract. An extended waiting time for rights to harvest the forest reduces a farmer’s perceived value of a contract. Farmers are also concerned with the tenure length. In one region, the annual willingenss to pay for a 50-year contract is even higher than the annual willingness to pay for 25-year contract.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers in Economics with number 370.
Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: 30 Jun 2009
Date of revision:
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Postal: Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, University of Gothenburg, Box 640, SE 405 30 GÖTEBORG, Sweden
Phone: 031-773 10 00
Web page: http://www.handels.gu.se/econ/
More information through EDIRC
China; Choice experiment; Forest; MWTP; Property rights;
Other versions of this item:
- Qin, Ping & Carlsson, Fredrik & Xu, Jinato, 2008. "Forestland Reform in China: What Do the Farmers Want? A Choice Experiment in Farmers’ Property Rights Preferences," Discussion Papers dp-08-35-rev-efd, Resources For the Future.
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- Q15 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment
- Q23 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Forestry
- Q50 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - General
- Q51 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Valuation of Environmental Effects
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AGR-2009-07-11 (Agricultural Economics)
- NEP-ALL-2009-07-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-DCM-2009-07-11 (Discrete Choice Models)
- NEP-DEV-2009-07-11 (Development)
- NEP-ENV-2009-07-11 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-TRA-2009-07-11 (Transition Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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