Qin, Pin () (College of Environmental Sciences and Engineering, Peking University) Carlsson, Fredrik () (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University) Xu, Jintao () (College of Environmental Sciences and Engineering, Peking University)
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Various decentralization experiments are currently underway in the Chinese forestry sector. However, a key question often ignored by researchers and policy makers is what farmers really want from reform. This paper addresses this question using a survey-based choice experiment. We investigated farmers’ preferences for various property-rights attributes of a forestland contract. We found that farmers are highly concerned with what types of rights a contract provides. Reducing perceived risks of contract termination and introducing a priority right in the renewal of an old contract significantly increase farmers’ marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) for a forest contract. An extended waiting time for rights to harvest the forest reduces a farmer’s perceived value of a contract. Farmers are also concerned with the tenure length. In one region, the annual willingenss to pay for a 50-year contract is even higher than the annual willingness to pay for 25-year contract.
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Paper provided by Göteborg University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers in Economics with number
370.
Length: 29 pages Date of creation: 30 Jun 2009 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0370
Contact details of provider: Postal: Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University Box 640, SE 405 30 GÖTEBORG, Sweden Phone: 031-773 10 00 Web page: http://www.handels.gu.se/econ/ More information through EDIRC
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