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Global environmental problems, efficiency and limited altruism

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  • Johansson-Stenman, Olof

    ()
    (Department of Economics, School of Economics and Commercial Law, Göteborg University)

Abstract

Global environmental problems are often assumed to imply extensive inefficiencies since there is no global authority corresponding to the government at a national level. This paper shows, on the contrary, that rich countries in a free unregulated market may still undertake globally efficient abatement investments, given the existence of limited nonpaternalistic altruism.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2077/2776
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers in Economics with number 139.

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Length: 10 pages
Date of creation: 09 Aug 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0139

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Postal: Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, University of Gothenburg, Box 640, SE 405 30 GÖTEBORG, Sweden
Phone: 031-773 10 00
Web page: http://www.handels.gu.se/econ/
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Keywords: Global environmental problems; externalities; altruism; transboundary pollution;

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  1. Ernst Fehr & Simon G�chter, 2000. "Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 159-181, Summer.
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  6. Baumol,William J. & Oates,Wallace E., 1988. "The Theory of Environmental Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521322249.
  7. Baumol,William J. & Oates,Wallace E., 1988. "The Theory of Environmental Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521311120.
  8. Andreoni, James, 1989. "Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1447-58, December.
  9. Babcock, Linda & Wang, Xianghong & Lowenstein, George, 1996. "Choosing the Wrong Pond: Social Comparisons in Negotiations That Reflect a Self-Serving Bias," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 111(1), pages 1-19, February.
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Cited by:
  1. Elias Asproudis, 2011. "Revisiting environmental groups and members’ behaviour: budget, size and (im)pure altruism," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 13(2), pages 139-156, June.
  2. Eckerstorfer, Paul & Wendner, Ronald, 2013. "Asymmetric and non-atmospheric consumption externalities, and efficient consumption taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 42-56.
  3. Johansson-Stenman, Olof, 2006. "Cost Benefit Rules when Nature Counts," Working Papers in Economics, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics 198, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics, revised 09 May 2006.
  4. Richard S.J. Tol, 2009. "International inequity aversion and the social cost of carbon," Working Papers, Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University FNU-178, Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University, revised Nov 2009.
  5. Tol, Richard S. J., 2008. "Measuring International Inequity Aversion," Papers, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) WP254, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI).
  6. Kuckshinrichs, Wilhelm & Kronenberg, Tobias & Hansen, Patrick, 2010. "The social return on investment in the energy efficiency of buildings in Germany," Energy Policy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 38(8), pages 4317-4329, August.

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