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Is No News (Perceived as) Bad News? An Experimental Investigation of Information Disclosure

Author

Listed:
  • Ginger Zhe Jin

    (University of Maryland)

  • Michael Luca

    (Harvard Busieness School, Negotiation, Organizations & Markets Unit)

  • Danie lMartin

    (Northwestern Kellogg School of Management)

Abstract

This paper uses laboratory experiments to directly test a central prediction of disclosure theory: that strategic forces can lead those who possess private information to voluntarily provide it. In a simple two-person disclosure game, we find that senders disclose favorable information, but withhold less favorable information. The degree to which senders withhold information is strongly related to their stated beliefs about receiver actions, and their stated beliefs are accurate on average. Receiver actions are also strongly related to their stated beliefs, but receiver actions and beliefs suggest they are insufficiently skeptical about non-disclosed information. As a result, senders increase expected returns by strategically withholding unfavorable information, in contrast with classic theoretical predictions.

Suggested Citation

  • Ginger Zhe Jin & Michael Luca & Danie lMartin, 2015. "Is No News (Perceived as) Bad News? An Experimental Investigation of Information Disclosure," Harvard Business School Working Papers 15-078, Harvard Business School, revised Nov 2017.
    • Handle: RePEc:hbs:wpaper:15-078
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    File URL: http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/pages/download.aspx?name=15-078.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ginger Zhe Jin & Michael Luca & Daniel Martin, 2021. "Is No News (Perceived As) Bad News? An Experimental Investigation of Information Disclosure," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 13(2), pages 141-173, May.
    2. Asen Ivanov & Dan Levin & Muriel Niederle, 2010. "Can Relaxation of Beliefs Rationalize the Winner's Curse?: An Experimental Study," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(4), pages 1435-1452, July.
    3. Muriel Niederle & Lise Vesterlund, 2007. "Do Women Shy Away From Competition? Do Men Compete Too Much?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 122(3), pages 1067-1101.
    4. Charles A. Holt & Susan K. Laury, 2002. "Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1644-1655, December.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Wenner, Lukas M., 2018. "Do sellers exploit biased beliefs of buyers? An experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 194-215.
    2. Viola Ackfeld & Werner Güth, 2019. "Personal Information Disclosure under Competition for Benefits: Is Sharing Caring?," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2019_04, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    3. Jesal Sheth, 2019. "Disclosure of information under competition: An experimental study," Discussion Papers 2019-04, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    4. Pogorelskiy. Kirill & Shum, Matthew, 2019. "News We Like to Share : How News Sharing on Social Networks Influences Voting Outcomes," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1199, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    5. Xavier Gabaix, 2017. "Behavioral Inattention," NBER Working Papers 24096, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Ingebretsen Carlson, Jim & Wu, Tingting, 2022. "Shill bidding and information in eBay auctions: A Laboratory study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 202(C), pages 341-360.
    7. Pogorelskiy, Kirill & Shum, Matthew, 2019. "News We Like to Share: How News Sharing on Social Networks Influences Voting Outcomes," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 427, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Communication games; Disclosure; Unraveling; Experiments;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality

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