Experimental comparison of compulsory and non compulsory arbitration mechanisms
AbstractWe run a series of experiments to compare the well known arbitration scheme FOA (Final Offer Arbitration) with a new arbitration scheme, non compulsory, we proposed in a companion paper (Tanimura and Thoron (2008)): ROC (Recursive Offer Conciliation). The two mechanisms are also compared with a negotiation without arbitration. We observe that the ROC mechanism seems to cumulate the advantages of the two other procedures, it avoids the high frequency of impasses observed under the FOA procedure and it is as efficient as the Free procedure in this respect. Furthermore, in an asymmetric treatment, it helps the subjects to find an agreement around the equal split of the surplus, like the arbitrator of the FOA procedure does, but without imposing anything on them.
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Date of creation: 08 Apr 2011
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negotiation; bargaining; arbitration; Raiffa solution; chilling effect; dispute resolution; experiments;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-04-23 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Dickinson, David L., 2006.
"The chilling effect of optimism: The case of final-offer arbitration,"
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics),
Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 17-30, February.
- David Dickinson, 2003. "The Chilling Effect Of Optimism: The Case of Final-Offer Arbitration," Working Papers 2003-01, Utah State University, Department of Economics.
- Walter Trockel, 2009. "An axiomatization of the Sequential Raiffa solution," Working Papers 425, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
- Emily Tanimura & Sylvie Thoron, 2008. "A mechanism for solving bargaining problems between risk averse players," Working Papers halshs-00325695, HAL.
- Manzini, Paola & Mariotti, Marco, 2001. "Perfect Equilibria in a Model of Bargaining with Arbitration," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 170-195, October.
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