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Expertise économique et politique publique : examen critique des propositions sur la dette liée à la pandémie

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  • Anne-Laure Delatte

    (Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres, LEDa - Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine - IRD - Institut de Recherche pour le Développement - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Benjamin Lemoine

    (IRISSO - Institut de Recherche Interdisciplinaire en Sciences Sociales - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres)

Abstract

Cette note analyse les logiques économiques et politiques des propositions concernant le traitement de la dette COVID formulées par différentes expertises, plus ou moins proches du gouvernement. Ces propositions contribuent à reconstruire un récit de la dette tout en s'inscrivant dans une logique politique conservatrice, en évacuant toute alternative budgétaire progressive. Après avoir explicité la façon dont, à travers l'histoire, le dispositif des caisses d'amortissement de la dette a été expérimenté, nous tirons les enseignements suivants : loin de se réduire à une opération cosmétique, les propositions engagent les finances publiques dans une logique disciplinaire au prix d'une possible augmentation du coût de financement de la dette. Cette décision, qui a déjà entraîné la prolongation d'un impôt régressif – la Contribution au Remboursement de la Dette Sociale, (CRDS) au cours de la crise pandémique – met toute la pression sur la baisse des dépenses publiques. Enfin, les propositions seraient de nature à freiner les réformes possibles de la gouvernance économique européenne.

Suggested Citation

  • Anne-Laure Delatte & Benjamin Lemoine, 2021. "Expertise économique et politique publique : examen critique des propositions sur la dette liée à la pandémie," Working Papers hal-03219581, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03219581
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-03219581v2
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    dette; finances publiques;

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