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Myopic governments and welfare-enhancing debt limits

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  • Rieth, Malte

Abstract

This paper studies welfare effects of a soft borrowing constraint on sovereign debt. The constraint is modeled as a proportional fine per unit of debt in excess of a specified reference value, resembling features of the Stability and Growth Pact. Sovereign debt is the result of myopic fiscal policy. It reduces welfare in the absence of lump-sum taxes. The paper shows that the borrowing constraint enhances welfare by reducing long run debt. In an economy calibrated to a generic OECD country, the maximum attainable welfare gain of debt consolidation, which is induced by imposing the optimally parameterized constraint, amounts to 0.5% in terms of consumption. The short run welfare costs of the constraint, which arise from restricting the use of debt to smooth taxes, are quantitatively negligible.

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  • Rieth, Malte, 2014. "Myopic governments and welfare-enhancing debt limits," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 250-265.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:38:y:2014:i:c:p:250-265
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2013.10.008
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    Cited by:

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    3. Enrico Saltari & Willi Semmler & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, 2022. "A Nash Equilibrium for Differential Games with Moving-Horizon Strategies," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 60(3), pages 1041-1054, October.
    4. Raveh, Ohad & Tsur, Yacov, 2020. "Resource windfalls and public debt: A political economy perspective," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 123(C).
    5. Luca Guerrieri & Matteo Iacoviello & Raoul Minetti, 2013. "Banks, Sovereign Debt, and the International Transmission of Business Cycles," NBER International Seminar on Macroeconomics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 9(1), pages 181-213.
    6. Ohad Raveh & Yacov Tsur, 2018. "Resource Windfalls and Public Debt: The Role of Political Myopia," OxCarre Working Papers 205, Oxford Centre for the Analysis of Resource Rich Economies, University of Oxford.
    7. Grant, Everett, 2016. "Exposure to international crises: trade vs. financial contagion," ESRB Working Paper Series 30, European Systemic Risk Board.
    8. Dallal Bendjellal, 2022. "Sovereign Risk, Financial Fragility and Debt Maturity," AMSE Working Papers 2222, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France.
    9. Raveh, Ohad & Tsur, Yacov, 2020. "Reelection, growth and public debt," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    10. Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Marco Di Pietro & Enrico Saltari & Willi Semmler, 2018. "Public debt stabilization: the relevance of policymakers’ time horizons," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 177(3), pages 287-299, December.
    11. Mayank GUPTA, 2015. "Revisiting Neoclassical Economic Growth: A Survey in the Literature," Journal of Economics and Political Economy, KSP Journals, vol. 2(1), pages 118-136, March.
    12. Dirk Bursian, 2017. "Solving RE models with discontinuous policy rules – an application to minimum wage setting in Germany," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(15), pages 1121-1126, September.
    13. Ohad Raveh & Yacov Tsur, 2017. "Political Myopia, Public Debt," OxCarre Working Papers 200, Oxford Centre for the Analysis of Resource Rich Economies, University of Oxford.
    14. Pietro Cova & Patrizio Pagano & Massimiliano Pisani, 2014. "Foreign exchange reserve diversification and the "exorbitant privilege"," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 964, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Myopic governments; Debt bias; Fiscal constraints; Stability and Growth Pact; Social welfare;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E6 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook
    • H3 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents

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