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How to manage multiple interdepedent agents

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  • Pierre Fleckinger

    (CECO - Laboratoire d'econometrie de l'école polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7657 - Polytechnique - X)

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    Abstract

    Un modèle de firme dans un cadre principal-multiagent avec sélection adverse est analysé. L'efficacité de la firme dépend d'activités directement productives ainsi que de l'ajustement entre ces activités. Cet ajustement peut-être explicitement coûteux. La spécificité du modèle est que l'information privée d'un division ne peut pas être ordonné objectivement, comme il est possible dans les modèles standard utilisant la condition de Spence-Mirrlees. Cette spécificité induit un profil de rente non-monotone. Cependant, sous une certaine condition, l'optimum de premier rang peut être implémenté par le centre. Cette condition est reliée à la possibilité pour le centre de créer des incitations contraires "bayésiennes".

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    File URL: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/24/29/83/PDF/2005-06-06-947.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number hal-00242983.

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    Date of creation: 2003
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    Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00242983

    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00242983/en/
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    Related research

    Keywords: Multi-agent; Planification; Sélection adverse;

    References

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    1. Sappington, David & Demski, Joel S., 1983. "Multi-agent control in perfectly correlated environments," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 325-330.
    2. Lewis, Tracy R. & Sappington, David E. M., 1989. "Countervailing incentives in agency problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 294-313, December.
    3. Demski, Joel S. & Sappington, David, 1984. "Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 152-171, June.
    4. Itoh, Hideshi, 1991. "Incentives to Help in Multi-agent Situations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 611-36, May.
    5. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1995. "Complementarities and fit strategy, structure, and organizational change in manufacturing," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2-3), pages 179-208, April.
    6. Arrow, Kenneth J, 1985. "Informational Structure of the Firm," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(2), pages 303-07, May.
    7. Choi, Yoon K., 1993. "Managerial incentive contracts with a production externality," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 37-42.
    8. Itoh, Hideshi, 1992. "Cooperation in Hierarchical Organizations: An Incentive Perspective," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(2), pages 321-45, April.
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