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On allocating seats to parties and districts: apportionments

Author

Listed:
  • Gabrielle Demange

    (PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

Abstract

The paper presents the problem of choosing the representatives in an assembly when the whole electoral region is subdivided into several electoral districts. Because of the two dimensions, geographical (districts) and political (parties), the problem is called bi-apportionment. The main purpose of the paper is to discuss fairness and proportionality axioms and to describe their implementation.

Suggested Citation

  • Gabrielle Demange, 2013. "On allocating seats to parties and districts: apportionments," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00879779, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-00879779
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219198913400148
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Demange,Gabrielle & Wooders,Myrna (ed.), 2005. "Group Formation in Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521842716.
    2. M. L. Balinski & G. Demange, 1989. "An Axiomatic Approach to Proportionality Between Matrices," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 14(4), pages 700-719, November.
    3. Marjorie B. Gassner, 1991. "Biproportional Delegations," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 3(3), pages 321-342, July.
    4. Sebastian Maier & Petur Zachariassen & Martin Zachariasen, 2010. "Divisor-Based Biproportional Apportionment in Electoral Systems: A Real-Life Benchmark Study," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 56(2), pages 373-387, February.
    5. Steven J. Brams, 1990. "Constrained Approval Voting: A Voting System to Elect a Governing Board," Interfaces, INFORMS, vol. 20(5), pages 67-80, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Party-proportional representation; Power indices; (Bi-)apportionment; (Bi-)divisor methods; Fair shares;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
    • C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics

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