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Beyond Carrots and Sticks: How Cooperation and Its Rewards Evolve Together

Author

Listed:
  • Luigino Bruni

    (Dipartimento di Scienze economiche, politiche e delle lingue moderne - LUMSA University)

  • Fabrizio Panebianco

    (PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

  • Alessandra Smerilli

    (PFSE Auxilium - PFSE Auxilium, School of Economics - UEA - University of East Anglia [Norwich])

Abstract

This paper is based on the intuition of Dragonetti, an old Neapolitan economist, which argues that a society experiences economic and civic development if agents promote values and virtues, more than solely rely on punishments stated by law. We thus study the evolution of cooperative behaviors using a mechanism of endogenous social rewards for cooperation (SRC). These additional (material) rewards depend on the recognition that the society--each agent in the society--gives to cooperative strategies. We formalize it with a cultural evolution model in which the payoff matrix and the population shares coevolve. We find that this endogenous mechanism can produce a large variety of long-run situations (victory of cooperators, of non-cooperators or, finally, their coexistence) depending on the social features. Moreover, we analyze the differences between SRC and exogenous punishment, changes in cooperation costs or changes in repetition of interactions and we disentangle their respective contributions.

Suggested Citation

  • Luigino Bruni & Fabrizio Panebianco & Alessandra Smerilli, 2014. "Beyond Carrots and Sticks: How Cooperation and Its Rewards Evolve Together," Post-Print halshs-00955369, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00955369
    DOI: 10.1080/00346764.2014.884388
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Susanne Neckermann & Bruno S. Frey, 2008. "Awards as Incentives," IEW - Working Papers 334, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    2. Ken Binmore, 1998. "Game Theory and the Social Contract - Vol. 2: Just Playing," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 2, number 0262024446, December.
    3. Geoffrey M. Hodgson, 1999. "Evolution and Institutions," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1481.
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    Cited by:

    1. Fabrizio Panebianco, 2016. "The role of persuasion in cultural evolution dynamics," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 63(3), pages 233-258, September.
    2. Michael Carr & Aurelie Charles & Wilfred Dolfsma & Robert McMaster & Tonia Warnecke, 2015. "Effective Contributions to the Review of Social Economy and Social Economics—Editorial," Review of Social Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 73(2), pages 139-145, June.

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