This paper extends the analogy previously established by Leamer (1978a), between a Bayesian inference problem and an economics allocation problem, and shows that posterior modes can be interpreted as optimal outcomes of a bargaining game. This bargaining game, over a parameter value, is played between two players: the researcher, with preferences represented by the prior, and the data, with preferences represented by the likelihood.
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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Econometrics with number
0110001.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C11 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: General - - - Bayesian Analysis C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
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