Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Les particularités de la société en commandite par actions au regard des conflits d'agence

Contents:

Author Info

  • Patrice Charlier

    ()
    (CESAG - Centre d'études des sciences appliquées à la gestion - Université de Strasbourg)

  • Jean-Baptiste Cartier

    ()
    (Centre de Recherche Magellan - Université de Lyon - Université Jean Moulin - Lyon III : EA3713)

Abstract

L'objectif de cette étude est d'analyser les relations entre les gérants, les associés-commandités et les actionnaires-commanditaires de société en commandite par actions (SCA) familiales. Les relations entre ces trois catégories d'acteurs présentent des spécificités originales au regard des conflits d'agence, entre associés et dirigeants (type I), et entre actionnaires majoritaires et minoritaires (type II). Les particularités de la SCA en font un excellent cadre de gouvernance pour les entreprises familiales, notamment en raison de la dissociation entre le pouvoir et la détention du capital.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/80/75/73/PDF/Article_SCA_FDG_Vfinale_PC_JBC_Decembre_2012.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number halshs-00807573.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 06 Dec 2012
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published - Presented, Fiscalité, Droit et Sciences de Gestion, 4e Colloque international, 2012, Marrakech, Morocco
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00807573

Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00807573
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/

Related research

Keywords: gouvernance familiale; conflits d'agence type I et II; société en commandite par actions; enracinement;

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-29, May.
  2. Alexandre, Hervé & Paquerot, Mathieu, 2000. "Efficacité des structures de contrôle et enracinement des dirigeants," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/6186, Paris Dauphine University.
  3. Patrice Charlier, 2008. "Gouvernance, enracinement et performance des entreprises familiales européennes," Post-Print halshs-00522463, HAL.
  4. Ali, Ashiq & Chen, Tai-Yuan & Radhakrishnan, Suresh, 2007. "Corporate disclosures by family firms," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(1-2), pages 238-286, September.
  5. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Agency Problems and Residual Claims," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 327-49, June.
  6. Pugh, William N & Page, Daniel E & Jahera, John S, Jr, 1992. "Antitakeover Charter Amendments: Effects on Corporate Decisions," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 15(1), pages 57-67, Spring.
  7. Villalonga, Belen & Amit, Raphael, 2006. "How do family ownership, control and management affect firm value?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 385-417, May.
  8. Easterbrook, Frank H, 1984. "Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(4), pages 650-59, September.
  9. Laurence Godard, 1998. "Les déterminants du choix entre un conseil d'administration et un conseil de surveillance," Working Papers CREGO 0981201, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
  10. Gérard Charreaux & Philippe Desbrières, 1997. "Le point sur le gouvernement des entreprises," Working Papers CREGO 0970701, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
  11. Castanias, Richard P. & Helfat, Constance E., 1992. "Managerial and windfall rents in the market for corporate control," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 153-184, July.
  12. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1986. "Large Shareholders and Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 461-88, June.
  13. Ronald C. Anderson & David M. Reeb, 2003. "Founding-Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(3), pages 1301-1327, 06.
  14. Williamson, Oliver E., 1996. "Transaction cost economics and the Carnegie connection," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 149-155, November.
  15. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-25, June.
  16. Demsetz, Harold & Lehn, Kenneth, 1985. "The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(6), pages 1155-77, December.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00807573. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.