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Gouvernance Familiale Et Repartition De La Valeur : Etude Des Politiques De Distribution Aux Actionnaires Des Entreprises Familiales Cotees

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Author Info

  • Patrice Charlier

    (CESAG - Centre d'études des sciences appliquées à la gestion - Université de Strasbourg)

  • Céline Du Boys

    (CERGAM - Université Paul Cézanne - Aix-Marseille III)

Abstract

Cet article analyse le montant et la forme des politiques de distribution des entreprises familiales cotées. Les évolutions récentes de la notion d'entreprise familiale amènent à s'interroger sur les effets de deux types de conflits d'agence, entre actionnaires et dirigeant (type I), et entre actionnaires majoritaires et minoritaires (type II). Nos résultats montrent que les montants distribués sont liés à ces deux composantes du conflit d'agence, qui est globalement moins fort dans les entreprises familiales. Il apparait ainsi une répartition différente des revenus dans les structures familiales, les distributions aux actionnaires y étant plus faibles. Cet article suggère également que les politiques de distribution sont utilisées pour modifier la répartition des pouvoirs : les entreprises où la famille dirigeante est minoritaire privilégient l'utilisation du rachat, outil de concentration du contrôle.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number halshs-00455729.

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Date of creation: 2009
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Publication status: Published - Presented, La place de la dimension européenne dans la Comptabilité Contrôle Audit, 2009, France
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00455729

Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00455729/en/
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Related research

Keywords: dividende; rachat d'actions; gouvernance familiale; conflits d'agence type I et II; répartition de la valeur;

References

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  1. Edith Ginglinger & Jacques Hamon, 2009. "Share repurchase regulations: do firms play by the rules?," Post-Print, HAL halshs-00143974, HAL.
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  11. Franklin Allen & Roni Michaely, 2002. "Payout Policy," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania 01-21, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
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  16. repec:hal:journl:halshs-00143974_v1 is not listed on IDEAS
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