Publicité limitée de l'information et sur-réaction aux annonces lors des épisodes spéculatifs
Abstract
Le modèle de Morris et Shin [2002] montre que des annonces publiques imprécises peuvent coordonner les spéculateurs loin de la solution fondamentale par un phénomène de sur-réaction aux annonces. Le fort potentiel focal exercé par la connaissance commune est dommageable au bien-être lorsqu'il induit de la sur-réaction à un signal public imprécis. Pourtant, les expériences de laboratoire montrent que les agents sur-réagissent aux annonces, mais pas aussi fortement que ce que prédisent les modèles théoriques existants, fondés sur de l'information publique qui génère de la connaissance commune. Ce papier introduit la notion de publicité limitée de l'information qui semble mieux à même de rendre compte du degré réel de sur-réaction des agents.Download Info
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Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number halshs-00137477.Length:
Date of creation: May 2006
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published, Revue Economique, 2006, 57, 3, 399-405
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00137477
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00137477/en/
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Related research
Keywords: publicité limitée de l'information ; sur-réaction ; spéculation;Other versions of this item:
- Camille Cornand & Frank Heinemann, 2006. "Publicité limitée de l'information et sur-réaction aux annonces lors des épisodes spéculatifs," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 57(3), pages 399-405.
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- F31 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Exchange
References
References listed on IDEASPlease report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Camille Cornand & Frank Heinemann, 2008.
"Optimal Degree of Public Information Dissemination,"
Economic Journal,
Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(528), pages 718-742, 04.
- Cornand, Camille & Heinemann, Frank, 2006. "Optimal Degree of Public Information Dissemination," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 158, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Camille Cornand & Frank Heinemann, 2004. "Optimal Degree of Public Information Dissemination," CESifo Working Paper Series 1353, CESifo Group Munich.
- Dorothea K¸bler & Georg Weizs”cker, 2004. "Limited Depth of Reasoning and Failure of Cascade Formation in the Laboratory," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71(2), pages 425-441, 04.
- Frank Heinemann & Rosemarie Nagel & Peter Ockenfels, 2004. "The Theory of Global Games on Test: Experimental Analysis of Coordination Games with Public and Private Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(5), pages 1583-1599, 09.
- Nagel, Rosemarie, 1995. "Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1313-26, December.
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