A Humean Theory of Choice of which Rationality May Be One Consequence
AbstractFor the reader who considers economic theory of choice as a special case of a more general theory of action, Hume's discussion of the determinants of action in the Treatise of Human Nature (1739-1740), in the Enquiry on Human Understanding (1748), and in the Dissertation on Passions (1757), deserves attention. However, according to some modern commentators, Hume does not seem to have given any evidence which would favour what we nowadays consider as the kind of rationality involved in modern theories of rational choice. On the contrary, this paper arrives to the conclusion that consistency between preferences and choice, like the usual properties of completeness and transitivity, may be considered as outcomes of a mental process, described by means of a decision algorithm which aims at representing Hume's theory of choice.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number hal-00343841.
Date of creation: 2005
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Publication status: Published, European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 2005, 12, 1, 89-111
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Hume; rationality; decision; passion; desire; preference; will; choice; rationalité; décision; désir; préférences; volonté; choix;
Other versions of this item:
- Marc-Arthur Diaye & Andre Lapidus, 2005. "A Humean theory of choice of which rationality may be one consequence," European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 12(1), pages 89-111.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Simon, Herbert A, 1978. "Rationality as Process and as Product of Thought," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 68(2), pages 1-16, May.
- Marc-Arthur Diaye & André Lapidus, 2012.
"Pleasure and belief in Hume's decision process,"
- Marc-Arthur Diaye & André Lapidus, 2012. "Pleasure and belief in Hume's Decision Process," European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 19(3), pages 355-384, July.
- André Lapidus, 2011. "The Possibility of a Welfare Policy in a World of Emotion-Driven Individuals: A Humean Point of View," Post-Print hal-00538106, HAL.
- Andre Lapidus, 2010.
"The valuation of decision and individual welfare: a Humean approach,"
European Journal of the History of Economic Thought,
Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 17(1), pages 1-28.
- André Lapidus, 2010. "The Valuation of Decision and Individual Welfare: A Humean Approach," Post-Print hal-00344868, HAL.
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