Rational Choice: A Survey of Contributions from Economics and Philosophy
Abstract
This paper looks at the philosophical foundations of rational-choice theory. It is argued that L. Savage's expected-utility axioms cannot be defended as requirements of instrumental rationality, in part because of their implications for the description of consequences. Then it is argued that common knowledge of rationality does not imply that rational game-players must be in Nash equilibrium, and for some games is an incoherent concept. Finally, the suggestion that rational-choice theory is self-defeating is examined in relation to coordination games (where the theory cannot explain the role of salience) and the concept of "resolute" choice. Copyright 1991 by Royal Economic Society.Download Info
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic Info
Article provided by Royal Economic Society in its journal The Economic Journal.
Volume (Year): 101 (1991)
Issue (Month): 407 (July)
Pages: 751-85
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.res.org.uk/
More information through EDIRC
Order Information:
Web: http://www.blackwellpublishers.co.uk/asp/journal.asp?ref=0013-0133
Related research
Keywords:References
No references listed on IDEASYou can help add them by filling out this form.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.
Lists
This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:101:y:1991:i:407:p:751-85For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

