Metamimetic Games : Modeling Metadynamics in Social Cognition
AbstractImitation is fundamental in the understanding of social system dynamics. But the diversity of imitation rules employed by modelers proves that the modeling of mimetic processes cannot avoid the traditional problem of endogenization of all the choices, including the one of the mimetic rules. Starting from the remark that human reflexive capacities are the ground for a new class of mimetic rules, I propose a formal framework, metamimetic games, that enable to endogenize the distribution of imitation rules while being human specific. The corresponding concepts of equilibrium - counterfactually stable state - and attractor are introduced. Finally, I give an interpretation of social differentiation in terms of cultural co-evolution among a set of possible motivations, which departs from the traditional view of optimization indexed to criteria that exist prior to the activity of agents.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number hal-00007743.
Date of creation: 2006
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Publication status: Published, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 2006, vol. 9, no. 2, 32 p.
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Social cognition; imitation; cultural co-evolution; differentiation; reflexivity; metacognition; stochastic game theory; endogenous distributions; metamimetic games; counterfactual equilibrium.;
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