Is Public-Private Partnership Obsolete?
AbstractPublic-Private Partnership has been high on the agenda of public decision makers since the 1990's. Primarily a contractual approach to the delivery of infrastructures, goods and services traditionally provided by the public sector or by private operators submitted to tight regulation, PPP is also a very special contractual practice as it seeks to introduce market-type relationships in a context in which non-market forces play a major role. An important consequence is the overlapping of decision rights as well as property rights, which exposes PPP to a double alignment problem, organizational and institutional. Away from the ideological controversies about the legitimacy of PPP in provisioning public goods, this chapter focuses on problems rooted in the very nature of PPPs and the actual design of their supportive contracts, as well as in the institutions in which they are embedded and that define the capacity to implement and monitor these arrangements properly.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by HAL in its series Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) with number halshs-00653090.
Date of creation: 28 Oct 2011
Date of revision:
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00653090
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/
Public-Private Partnership; transaction costs; organization; infrastructures; misalignment;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-02-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2012-02-08 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CWA-2012-02-08 (Central & Western Asia)
- NEP-PBE-2012-02-08 (Public Economics)
- NEP-PUB-2012-02-08 (Public Finance)
- NEP-REG-2012-02-08 (Regulation)
- NEP-TRE-2012-02-08 (Transport Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Bajari, Patrick & Tadelis, Steven, 2001.
"Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(3), pages 387-407, Autumn.
- Patrick Bajari & Steven Tadelis, 1999. "Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts," Working Papers 99029, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
- Künneke, Rolf & Groenewegen, John & Ménard, Claude, 2010. "Aligning modes of organization with technology: Critical transactions in the reform of infrastructures," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 494-505, September.
- Victor P. Goldberg, 1976. "Regulation and Administered Contracts," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(2), pages 426-448, Autumn.
- David Martimort & Stephane Straub, 2006. "Privatization and Changes in Corruption Patterns: The Roots of Public Discontent," ESE Discussion Papers 147, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- Katharina Gassner & Alexander Popov & Nataliya Pushak, 2009. "Does Private Sector Participation Improve Performance in Electricity and Water Distribution?," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 6605.
- J. Luis Guasch, 2004. "Granting and Renegotiating Infrastructure Concessions : Doing it Right," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 15024.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.