A "winner" under any voting rule ? An experiment on the single transferable vote
AbstractIn this paper, we expose the results of a voting experiment realised in 2007, during the French Presidential election. This experiment aimed at confronting the Single Transferable vote (SVT) procedure to two criteria : simplicity and the selection of a Condorcet-winner. Building on our electoral sample's preferences, we show that this voting procedure can design a different winner, depending on the vote counting process. With the vote counting process advocated by Hare, the winner is Nicolas Sarkozy, while the Coombs vote counting process has François Bayrou as winner. For these two vote counting processes, the details of the experiment are the same and it is shown that the simplicity criterion is respected. However, with regard to the Condorcet-winner criterion, the Coombs methods is the only one to elect the Condorcet-winner, i.e. François Bayrou.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by HAL in its series Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) with number halshs-00429725.
Date of creation: Jul 2009
Date of revision:
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00429725
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/
Field experiments; elections; Single Transferable Vote; voting system; Condorcet Winner.;
Other versions of this item:
- Etienne Farvaque & Hubert Jayet & Lionel Ragot, 2009. "A "winner" under any voting rule ? An experiment on the single transferable vote," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 09067, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-11-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2009-11-14 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-EXP-2009-11-14 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-POL-2009-11-14 (Positive Political Economics)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.