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Gains de productivité et contrôle de la recherche d'emploi

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  • Solenne Tanguy

    ()
    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Paris I - Panthéon-Sorbonne)

Abstract

Cet article analyse l'efficacité d'un système de contrôle des refus d'offres d'emploi. Un tel système conduit les chômeurs à réduire leurs exigences salariales ce qui se traduit par une baisse des salaires et par suite du taux de chômage. Cet article montre qu'une hausse des allocations chômage peut réduire le chômage si la pénalité imposée en cas de refus d'emploi correspond à une suppression des allocations chômage. Toutefois une trop forte modération salariale peut être problématique. Ce système incite en effet les travailleurs à accepter rapidement des emplois peu productifs. Il en découle une baisse de la productivité moyenne. Finalement, ce qui est gagné sur le plan quantitatif est perdu sur le plan qualitatif.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by HAL in its series Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) with number halshs-00113481.

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Date of creation: 2006
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Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00113481

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Keywords: Assurance chômage; contrôle; sanction; productivité; qualité des emplois.;

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  1. Acemoglu, Daron & Shimer, Robert, 2000. "Productivity gains from unemployment insurance," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(7), pages 1195-1224, June.
  2. Cahuc, Pierre & Lehmann, Etienne, 2000. "Should unemployment benefits decrease with the unemployment spell?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 135-153, July.
  3. Acemoglu, Daron, 2001. "Good Jobs versus Bad Jobs," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(1), pages 1-21, January.
  4. P. Diamond, 1980. "Mobility Costs, Frictional Unemployment and Efficiency," Working papers 257, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
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  7. Daron Acemoglu & Robert Shimer, 1998. "Efficient Unemployment Insurance," NBER Working Papers 6686, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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  12. Marimon, Ramon & Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 1997. "Unemployment versus Mismatch of Talents: Reconsidering Unemployment Benefits," CEPR Discussion Papers 1769, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  13. Boone, Jan & van Ours, Jan C, 2000. "Modelling Financial Incentives To Get Unemployed Back To Work," CEPR Discussion Papers 2361, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  14. Ljungqvist, Lars & Sargent, Thomas J., 1995. "The Swedish unemployment experience," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(5), pages 1043-1070, May.
  15. Hopenhayn, H. & Nicolini, P.J., 1996. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance," RCER Working Papers 421, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  16. Diamond, Peter A., 1971. "A model of price adjustment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 156-168, June.
  17. Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-44, June.
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