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Allocation du temps de travail des femmes au Sénégal - Travaux domestiques et activités génératrices de revenus

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  • Marie-Charlotte Buisson

    (CERDI - Centre d'Études et de Recherches sur le Développement International - UdA - Université d'Auvergne - Clermont-Ferrand I - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

L'allègement des travaux domestiques et l'accroissement de la part de revenu du ménage sur lequel les femmes ont un pouvoir de décision sont deux objectifs de développement complémentaires quoique motivés par des raisons différentes. Pour atteindre ces objectifs, il convient de comprendre comment le temps des femmes est alloué entre les tâches domestiques et le travail rémunéré. Cette décision est prise dans le cercle du ménage, il s'agit d'une allocation intra-ménage qui naît des relations entre membres. Plusieurs modèles de ménage établissent en théorie l'allocation entre travail domestique et activités génératrices de revenus (AGR). Des restrictions testables sont établies pour chaque modèle. Sur la base de données collectées au Sénégal, un modèle empirique est testé. L'estimation empirique consiste à déterminer l'effet du salaire sur le temps de travail domestique et sur le temps de travail en AGR. La question de la mesure du salaire est alors centrale, il est calculé à partir des données d'enquêtes comme le rapport entre le revenu et le temps de travail en AGR. Une correction de la variable est donc proposée, elle se base sur la prise en considération de la non homogénéité du travail et des erreurs de mesures. L'interdépendance entre la décision du temps de travail domestique et la décision du temps consacré au AGR, implique le choix d'estimations à partir de modèles seemingly unrelated regressions. Les résultats valident un modèle de type sphères séparées avec transfert monétaire pour expliquer cette allocation du travail. Ils soulignent également la faible élasticité des temps de travail, à la fois en AGR (élasticité positive) et en travaux domestique (élasticité négative) face au salaire remettant en question l'incitation financière pour le développement d'AGR. Le pouvoir de négociation issu du pouvoir économique antérieur au mariage est en revanche un fort déterminant de l'allocation actuelle du temps de travail.

Suggested Citation

  • Marie-Charlotte Buisson, 2012. "Allocation du temps de travail des femmes au Sénégal - Travaux domestiques et activités génératrices de revenus," CERDI Working papers halshs-00673119, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:cdiwps:halshs-00673119
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00673119
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    References listed on IDEAS

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