Peltzman on Ice: Evidence on Compensating Behavior Using a Natural Experiment from Ice Hockey
AbstractWe provide evidence of the Peltzman effect by tracking the professional path of each hockey player that ended up in the National Hockey League from 2001 to 2006. We take advantage of the fact that visor use has not always been compulsory throughout a player's career, which allows us to compare the change in behavior of users and non-users of visors when they are forced to use them. We find that whereas the average penalty minutes per game is 0.8, visors cause a substantial increase of 0.2 penalty minutes per game. Players become more aggressive when forced to wear a visor, partially offsetting its protective effect and creating potential spillover effects to other players.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The George Washington University, Institute for International Economic Policy in its series Working Papers with number 2011-12.
Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2011
Date of revision:
Peltzman Effect; Ice Hockey; Compensating Behavior;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
- K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
- H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-10-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-LAB-2011-10-09 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-LAW-2011-10-09 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-SPO-2011-10-09 (Sports & Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Russell S. Sobel & Todd M. Nesbit, 2007. "Automobile Safety Regulation and the Incentive to Drive Recklessly: Evidence from NASCAR," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 74(1), pages 71-84, July.
- Adam Pope & Robert Tollison, 2010. "“Rubbin’ is racin''': evidence of the Peltzman effect from NASCAR," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 142(3), pages 507-513, March.
- Loeb, Peter D, 1995. "The Effectiveness of Seat-Belt Legislation in Reducing Injury Rates in Texas," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 81-84, May.
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