Does illegal immigration empower rightist parties?
AbstractThe main goal of this paper is to analyze the political outcome in countries where the relevant issue in elections is the control of immigration. In particular we explore the consequences on the political outcome of the fact that parties are either ideological or opportunistic with respect to this issue. In order to do that we use a simple two-party political competition model in which the issues over which parties take positions are the level of border enforcement and the way it has to be financed. We show that an ideological rather than a pure opportunistic behavior gives parties an advantage to win the election. This result may help us to understand the recent success of anti-immigrant and rightist parties in several countries.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada. in its series ThE Papers with number 06/02.
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 08 Mar 2006
Date of revision:
Illegal immigration; ideological parties; unskilled and skilled.;
Other versions of this item:
- Angel García, 2006. "Does illegal immigration empower rightist parties?," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 19(4), pages 649-670, October.
- J61 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Geographic Labor Mobility; Immigrant Workers
- F22 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Migration
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
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- Gordon H. Hanson & Antonio Splimbergo, 1999.
"Political Economy, Sectoral Shocks, and Border Enforcement,"
NBER Working Papers
7315, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gordon H. Hanson & Antonio Spilimbergo, 2001. "Political economy, sectoral shocks, and border enforcement," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 34(3), pages 612-638, August.
- Hanson, G.H. & Spilimbergo, A., 1999. "Political Economy, Sectoral Shocks, and Border Enforcement," Working Papers 449, Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan.
- Christian Dustmann & Ian Preston, 2004. "Is Immigration Good or Bad for the Economy? Analysis of Attitudinal Responses," CReAM Discussion Paper Series 0406, Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration (CReAM), Department of Economics, University College London.
- Bauer, Thomas K. & Lofstrom, Magnus & Zimmermann, Klaus F., 2000. "Immigration Policy, Assimilation of Immigrants and Natives' Sentiments towards Immigrants: Evidence from 12 OECD-Countries," IZA Discussion Papers 187, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
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