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CFO Working Experience and Tax Avoidance

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  • Panagiotis Karavitis
  • Pantelis Kazakis
  • Tianyue Xu

Abstract

We ask whether CFO's managerial skills affect corporate tax avoidance using a sample of Chinese-listed companies. To that end, we develop a CFO managerial skills index based on four dimensions of the CFO's work experience: (1) the number of current positions a CFO holds, (2) the number of functional departments a CFO has worked in during his career, (3) the number of firms he has worked for, and (4) whether the CFO has political connections. We find that CFOs with high managerial skills are more likely to engage in aggressive tax avoidance. This effect is weakened when CFOs are in their first year of employment, approaching retirement, and are too busy. Moreover, we find that CFOs with general management skills are more likely to adjust corporate tax avoidance to levels similar to their peers.

Suggested Citation

  • Panagiotis Karavitis & Pantelis Kazakis & Tianyue Xu, 2022. "CFO Working Experience and Tax Avoidance," Working Papers 2022_14, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
    • Handle: RePEc:gla:glaewp:2022_14
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    Keywords

    Chief Financial Officer (CFO); work experience; managerial skills; tax avoidance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting

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