Voting over informal risk-sharing rules
AbstractPeople vote over risk-sharing rules to cope with random revenues. Risk-sharing rules are enforced through peer pressure : those who comply exert a negative externality on those who do not. People are differently affected by this externality. The author determines the elected risk-sharing rules and the level of compliance. It turns out that full risk-sharing is achieved only if everybody complies. Partial risk-sharing is more often achieved with, sometime, some level of non-compliance. In many cases, a majority of people votes over and complies with the risk-sharing rule that maximizes their own expected payoff.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL) in its series Working Papers with number 200509.
Date of creation: 2005
Date of revision:
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RISK SHARING; MUTUAL INSURANCE; ENFORCEMENT; PEER PRESSURE; POLITICAL ECONOMY;
Other versions of this item:
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- O15 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
- O17 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-04-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2006-04-22 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-DEV-2006-04-22 (Development)
- NEP-IAS-2006-04-22 (Insurance Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2006-04-22 (Public Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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