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Capital Structure Decisions in Small and Large Firms: A Life-cycle Theory of Financing Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Zsuzsanna Fluck
This paper focuses on the dynamic capital structure of firms: Why firms choose very different capital structure in different stages of their life-cycles? In a model of optimal financial contracting, we investigate whether subsequent financing decisions
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Paper provided by New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business- in its series New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires with number
99-069.
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Date of creation: 31 Oct 1999Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:nystfi:99-069Contact details of provider: Postal: U.S.A.; New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics . 44 West 4th Street. New York, New York 10012-1126 Web page: http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/finance/ More information through EDIRC
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Keywords: References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP)
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[Downloadable!] (restricted)
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[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Steven N. Kaplan & Per Stromberg, 2003.
"Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts ,"
Review of Economic Studies ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 70(2), pages 281-315, 04.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Kaplan, Steven & Strömberg, Per Johan, 2000.
"Financial Contracting Theory Meets The Real World: An Empirical Analysis Of Venture Capital Contracts ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
2421, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Steven N. Kaplan & Per Stromberg, 2000.
"Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts ,"
NBER Working Papers
7660, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, 2000.
"Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts ,"
CRSP working papers
513, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
[Downloadable!] Gompers, Paul A, 1995.
" Optimal Investment, Monitoring, and the Staging of Venture Capital ,"
Journal of Finance ,
American Finance Association, vol. 50(5), pages 1461-89, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Dybvig, Philip H & Zender, Jaime F, 1991.
"Capital Structure and Dividend Irrelevance with Asymmetric Information ,"
Review of Financial Studies ,
Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 4(1), pages 201-19.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Diamond, Douglas W, 1984.
"Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring ,"
Review of Economic Studies ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414, July.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Hayne E. Leland, 1998.
"Agency Costs, Risk Management, and Capital Structure ,"
Journal of Finance ,
American Finance Association, vol. 53(4), pages 1213-1243, 08.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1989.
"The design of securities ,"
Journal of Financial Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 255-287.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
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