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Cooperation and Effective Computability

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Author Info
Anderlini, L.
Sabourian, H.

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Abstract

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Cambridge - Risk, Information & Quantity Signals in its series Papers with number 167.

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Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: 1991
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:cambri:167

Contact details of provider:
Postal: UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE, RESEARCH PROJECT ON RISK, INFORMATION AND QUANTITY SIGNALS IN ECONOMICS(E.S.R.C.), DEPARTMENT OF APPLIED ECONOMICS, SIDGWICK AV. CAMBRIDGE CB3 9DEDE U.K..
Phone: +44 1223 335200
Fax: +44 1223 335475
Web page: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/dae/
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Related research
Keywords: game theory ; economic models;

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  1. William R. Zame, 1995. "Non-Computable Strategies and Discounted Repeated Games," UCLA Economics Working Papers 735, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Sheri M. Markose, 2004. "Novelty And Surprises In Complex Adaptive System (CAS) Dynamics: A Computational Theory of Actor Innovation," Economics Discussion Papers 575, University of Essex, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2004. "The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1490, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Alvaro Sandroni, 1997. "Reciprosity and Cooperation in Repeated Coordination Games: The Blurry Belief Approach," Discussion Papers 1200, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  5. Amit Pazgal, 1995. "Satisficing Leads to Cooperation in Mutual Interests Games," Discussion Papers 1126, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  6. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1996. "Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play," Levine's Working Paper Archive 470, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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