Are smarter groups more cooperative? Evidence from prisoner's dilemma experiments, 1959-2003
AbstractAre more intelligent groups better at cooperating? A meta-study of repeated prisoner's dilemma experiments run at numerous universities suggests that students cooperate 5-8% more often for every 100-point increase in the school's average SAT score. This result survives a variety of robustness tests. Axelrod [Axelrod, R., 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation. Basic Books, New York] recommends that the way to create cooperation is to encourage players to be patient and perceptive; experimental evidence suggests that more intelligent groups implicitly follow this advice.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
Volume (Year): 68 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3-4 (December)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo
Intelligence IQ Prisoner's dilemma Cooperation Cognitive ability;
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