Why Voters May Prefer Congested Public Clubs
AbstractGovernmental facilities for such services as education, health, and transportation are often small, of poor quality, and overcrowded, even when the costs are spread among all taxpayers. We also find that governments may subsidize private facilities providing the same services, or may charge admission fees at public facilities. We explain these phenomena with a model which considers two types of people, rich and poor. A majority consisting of poor people may purposely build small and low quality facilities to discourage use by the rich, thereby lowering taxes. For the same reason, the poor may benefit from an admission fee at public clubs, or even from a subsidy to private clubs they do not use.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by California Irvine - School of Social Sciences in its series Papers with number 90-91-18.
Length: 13 pages
Date of creation: 1990
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA IRVINE, SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, IRVINECALIFORNIA 91717 U.S.A.
politics ; economic models ; public services;
Other versions of this item:
- Glazer, Amihai & Niskanen, Esko, 2001. "Why voters may prefer congested public clubs," University of California Transportation Center, Working Papers qt2rm6x4kc, University of California Transportation Center.
- Glazer, Amihai & Niskanen, Esko, 1992. "Why Voters May Prefer Congested Public Clubs," University of California Transportation Center, Working Papers qt9vk9r6zm, University of California Transportation Center.
- Glazer, Amihai & Niskanen, Esko, 1992. "Why voters may prefer congested public clubs," University of California Transportation Center, Working Papers qt16j5s39d, University of California Transportation Center.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Besley, T. & Coate, S., 1989.
"Public Provision Of Private Goods And The Redistribution Of Income,"
36, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper.
- Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1991. "Public Provision of Private Goods and the Redistribution of Income," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(4), pages 979-84, September.
- Sonstelie, Jon, 1982. "The Welfare Cost of Free Public Schools," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(4), pages 794-808, August.
- Stiglitz, J. E., 1974. "The demand for education in public and private school systems," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 349-385, November.
- Kangsik, Choi, 2011. "Cournot and Bertrand competition with asymmetric costs in a mixed duopoly," MPRA Paper 34100, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Gradstein, Mark & Justman, Moshe, 2005. "The melting pot and school choice," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(5-6), pages 871-896, June.
- Christoph Starke, 2012. "Serving the many or serving the most needy?," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 365-386, December.
- Kangsik, Choi, 2012. "Cournot and Bertrand competition with asymmetric costs in a mixed duopoly revisited," MPRA Paper 37704, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 28 Mar 2012.
- Zanola, Roberto, 2000. "Public goods versus publicly provided private goods in a two-class economy," POLIS Working Papers 12, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
- Mark Gradstein & Moshe Justman, 1996. "The political economy of mixed public and private schooling: A dynamic analysis," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 297-310, July.
- Christoph Starke, 2010. "Serving the Many or Serving the Most Needy?," FEMM Working Papers 100002, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
- Steffen Burchhardt & Christoph Starke, 2010. "Target-Group and Quality Decisions of Inequity-Averse Entrepreneurs," FEMM Working Papers 100011, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.