Revisiting the Case for a Populist Central Banker
AbstractIt is known that discretionary policy may give rise to an infaltionary bias if wages are negotiated in nominal terms. It has recently been argued that this bias can be eliminated, and welfare maximized, by the appointment of a central banker who does not care at all about inflation.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Banca Italia - Servizio di Studi in its series Papers with number 386.
Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
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Postal: Banca d'Italia-Servizio Studi-Divisione Biblioteca e Pubblicazioni - Via N azionale, 91 -00184 Rome, Italy.
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WAGES ; BANKS ; INFLATION;
Other versions of this item:
- Lippi, Francesco, 1999. "Revisiting the Case for a Populist Central Banker," CEPR Discussion Papers 2306, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Francesco Lippi, 2000. "Revisiting the Case for a Populist Central Banker," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 386, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
- E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
- J5 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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