It is known that discretionary policy may give rise to an infaltionary bias if wages are negotiated in nominal terms. It has recently been argued that this bias can be eliminated, and welfare maximized, by the appointment of a central banker who does not care at all about inflation.
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Paper provided by Banca Italia - Servizio di Studi in its series Papers with number
386.
Find related papers by JEL classification: E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit J5 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining
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Acocella Nicola & Di Bartolomeo Giovanni & Tirelli Patrizio, 2007.
"The macroeconomics of social pacts,"
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0028, Department of Communication, University of Teramo.
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