Endogenous Neighborhood Selection and the Attainment of Cooperation in a Spatial Prisoner's Dilemma Game
AbstractThere is a large literature in economics and elsewhere on the emergence and evolution of cooperation in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. Recently this literature has expanded to include cooperation in spatial prisoner dilemma games where agents play only with local neighbors in a specified geography. In this paper we explore how the ability of agents to move and choose new locations and new neighbors influences the emergence of cooperation. First, we explore the dynamics of cooperation by investigating agent strategies that yield Markov transition probabilities. We show how different agent strategies yield different Markov chains which generate different asymptotic behaviors in regard to the attainment of cooperation. Second, we investigate how agent movement affects the attainment of cooperation in various spatial networks using agent based simulations.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Fordham University, Department of Economics in its series Fordham Economics Discussion Paper Series with number dp2008-21.
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
repeated prisoner's dilemma; cooperation; agent-based economics; endogenous networks; Markov chains;
Other versions of this item:
- Jason Barr & Troy Tassier, 2010. "Endogenous Neighborhood Selection and the Attainment of Cooperation in a Spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma Game," Computational Economics, Society for Computational Economics, vol. 35(3), pages 211-234, March.
- C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-10-28 (All new papers)
- NEP-CMP-2008-10-28 (Computational Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2008-10-28 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-GEO-2008-10-28 (Economic Geography)
- NEP-GTH-2008-10-28 (Game Theory)
- NEP-SOC-2008-10-28 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
- NEP-URE-2008-10-28 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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