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Segregation and Strategic Neighborhood Interaction

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  • Jason M Barr

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Rutgers University, Newark, USA.)

  • Troy Tassier

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Fordham University, Bronx, NY 10458.)

Abstract

We introduce social interactions into the Schelling model of residential choice; these interactions take the form of a Prisoner's Dilemma game. We first study a Schelling model and a spatial Prisoner's Dilemma model separately to provide benchmarks for studying a combined model, with preferences over like-typed neighbors and payoffs in the spatial Prisoner's Dilemma game. We find that the presence of these additional social interactions may increase or decrease segregation compared to the standard Schelling model. If the social interactions result in cooperation then segregation is reduced, otherwise it can be increased. Eastern Economic Journal (2008) 34, 480–503. doi:10.1057/eej.2008.26

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Palgrave Macmillan in its journal Eastern Economic Journal.

Volume (Year): 34 (2008)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 480-503

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Handle: RePEc:pal:easeco:v:34:y:2008:i:4:p:480-503

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  1. Cutler, David M & Glaeser, Edward L, 1997. "Are Ghettos Good or Bad?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(3), pages 827-72, August.
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Cited by:
  1. Sebastian Grauwin & Florence Goffette-Nagot & Pablo Jensen, 2009. "Dynamic models of residential segregation: Brief review, analytical resolution and study of the introduction of coordination," Working Papers 0914, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure.
  2. Sebastian Grauwin & Florence Goffette-Nagot & Pablo Jensen, 2012. "Dynamic models of residential segregation: An analytical solution," Post-Print hal-00650292, HAL.
  3. Jason Barr & Troy Tassier, 2008. "Endogenous Neighborhood Selection and the Attainment of Cooperation in a Spatial Prisoner's Dilemma Game," Fordham Economics Discussion Paper Series dp2008-21, Fordham University, Department of Economics.
  4. Glaeser, Edward Ludwig & Laibson, David I. & Scheinkman, Jose A. & Soutter, Christine L., 2000. "Measuring Trust," Scholarly Articles 4481497, Harvard University Department of Economics.

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