Segregation and Strategic Neighborhood Interaction
AbstractWe introduce social interactions into the Schelling model of residential choice; these interactions take the form of a Prisoner's Dilemma game. We first study a Schelling model and a spatial Prisoner's Dilemma model separately to provide benchmarks for studying a combined model, with preferences over like-typed neighbors and payoffs in the spatial Prisoner's Dilemma game. We find that the presence of these additional social interactions may increase or decrease segregation compared to the standard Schelling model. If the social interactions result in cooperation then segregation is reduced, otherwise it can be increased. Eastern Economic Journal (2008) 34, 480–503. doi:10.1057/eej.2008.26
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Palgrave Macmillan in its journal Eastern Economic Journal.
Volume (Year): 34 (2008)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.palgrave-journals.com/
Postal: Palgrave Macmillan Journals, Subscription Department, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS, UK
Other versions of this item:
- Jason Barr & Troy Tassier, 2007. "Segregation and Strategic Neighborhood Interaction," Working Papers Rutgers University, Newark 2007-001, Department of Economics, Rutgers University, Newark.
- C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Cutler, David M & Glaeser, Edward L, 1997.
"Are Ghettos Good or Bad?,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 112(3), pages 827-72, August.
- Sebastian Grauwin & Florence Goffette-Nagot & Pablo Jensen, 2009.
"Dynamic models of residential segregation: Brief review, analytical resolution and study of the introduction of coordination,"
0914, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure.
- Florence Goffette-Nagot & Pablo Jensen & Sébastian Grauwin, 2009. "Dynamic models of residential segregation: Brief review, analytical resolution and study of the introduction of coordination," Post-Print halshs-00404400, HAL.
- Sebastian Grauwin & Florence Goffette-Nagot & Pablo Jensen, 2012.
"Dynamic models of residential segregation: An analytical solution,"
- Grauwin, Sébastian & Goffette-Nagot, Florence & Jensen, Pablo, 2012. "Dynamic models of residential segregation: An analytical solution," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 124-141.
- Sébastian Grauwin & Florence Goffette-Nagot & Pablo Jensen, 2010. "Dynamic models of residential ségrégation: an analytical solution," Post-Print halshs-00502758, HAL.
- Sebastian Grauwin & Florence Goffette-Nagot & Pablo Jensen, 2010. "Dynamic models of residential segregation : an analytical solution," Working Papers 1017, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure.
- Jason Barr & Troy Tassier, 2008.
"Endogenous Neighborhood Selection and the Attainment of Cooperation in a Spatial Prisoner's Dilemma Game,"
Fordham Economics Discussion Paper Series
dp2008-21, Fordham University, Department of Economics.
- Jason Barr & Troy Tassier, 2010. "Endogenous Neighborhood Selection and the Attainment of Cooperation in a Spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma Game," Computational Economics, Society for Computational Economics, vol. 35(3), pages 211-234, March.
- Glaeser, Edward Ludwig & Laibson, David I. & Scheinkman, Jose A. & Soutter, Christine L., 2000.
4481497, Harvard University Department of Economics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Elizabeth Gale).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.