Environmental options and technological innovation: an evolutionary game model
AbstractThis paper analyzes the effects on economic agents’ behaviour of an innovative environmental protection mechanism that the Public Administration of a tourist region may adopt to attract visitors while protecting the environment. On the one hand, the Public Administration sells to the tourists an environmental call option that gives them the possibility of being (partially or totally) reimbursed if the environmental quality in the region turns out to be unsatisfactory (i.e. below a given threshold level). On the other hand, it offers the firms that adopt an innovative, non-polluting technology an environmental put option that allows them to get a reimbursement for the additional costs imposed by the new technology if the environmental quality is sufficiently good (i.e. above the threshold level).The aim of the paper is to study the dynamics that arises with this financial mechanism from the interaction between the economic agents and the Public Administration in an evolutionary game context.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa in its series Working Papers - Mathematical Economics with number 2009-04.
Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2009
Date of revision:
environmental bonds; call and put options; technological innovation; evolutionary dynamics;
Other versions of this item:
- Angelo Antoci & Simone Borghesi & Marcello Galeotti, 2013. "Environmental options and technological innovation: an evolutionary game model," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 247-269, April.
- Simone Borghesi & Angelo Antoci & Marcello Galeotti, 2009. "Environmental Options and Technological Innovation: An Evolutionary Game Model," Working Papers 2009.90, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- Q55 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Technological Innovation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-10-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENV-2009-10-17 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2009-10-17 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-TUR-2009-10-17 (Tourism Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Perrings, Charles, 1989. "Environmental bonds and environmental research in innovative activities," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 95-110, February.
- Costanza, Robert & Perrings, Charles, 1990. "A flexible assurance bonding system for improved environmental management," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 57-75, April.
- Perrings,Charles, 1987. "Economy and Environment," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521340816, October.
- Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997. "Evolutionary Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215, December.
- Angelo Antoci & Marcello Galeotti & Davide Radi, 2011.
"Financial tools for the abatement of traffic congestion: a dynamical analysis,"
Working Papers - Mathematical Economics
2011-01, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa.
- Angelo Antoci & Marcello Galeotti & Davide Radi, 2011. "Financial Tools for the Abatement of Traffic Congestion: A Dynamical Analysis," Computational Economics, Society for Computational Economics, vol. 38(3), pages 389-405, October.
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