Angelo Antocii (Universita' degli Studi di Sassari) Simone Borghesi () (Universita' degli Studi di Siena) Marcello Galeotti () (Dipartimento di Matematica per le Decisioni, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze)
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This paper analyzes the effects on economic agents’ behaviour of an innovative environmental protection mechanism that the Public Administration of a tourist region may adopt to attract visitors while protecting the environment. On the one hand, the Public Administration sells to the tourists an environmental call option that gives them the possibility of being (partially or totally) reimbursed if the environmental quality in the region turns out to be unsatisfactory (i.e. below a given threshold level). On the other hand, it offers the firms that adopt an innovative, non-polluting technology an environmental put option that allows them to get a reimbursement for the additional costs imposed by the new technology if the environmental quality is sufficiently good (i.e. above the threshold level).The aim of the paper is to study the dynamics that arises with this financial mechanism from the interaction between the economic agents and the Public Administration in an evolutionary game context.
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Paper provided by Dipartimento di Matematica per le Decisioni, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze in its series DiMaD Working Papers with number
2009-04.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies Q55 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Technological Innovation
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