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Public disclosure, risk, and performance at bank holding companies

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  • Beverly Hirtle

Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between the amount of information disclosed by bank holding companies (BHCs) and their subsequent risk profile and performance. Using data from the annual reports of BHCs with large trading operations, we construct an index of publicly disclosed information about the BHCs? forward-looking estimates of market risk exposure in their trading and market-making activities. The paper then examines the relationship between this index and the subsequent risk and return in both the BHCs? trading activities and the firm overall, as proxied by equity market returns. The key findings are that more disclosure is associated with lower risk, especially idiosyncratic risk, and in turn with higher risk-adjusted returns. These findings suggest that greater disclosure is associated with more efficient risk taking and thus improved risk-return trade-offs, although the direction of causation is unclear.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of New York in its series Staff Reports with number 293.

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Date of creation: 2007
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Handle: RePEc:fip:fednsr:293

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Related research

Keywords: Bank holding companies ; Risk assessment ; Financial risk management;

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References

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  1. Darryll Hendricks & Beverly Hirtle, 1997. "Bank capital requirements for market risk: the internal models approach," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Dec, pages 1-12.
  2. Nier, Erlend & Baumann, Ursel, 2006. "Market discipline, disclosure and moral hazard in banking," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 332-361, July.
  3. Stewart C. Myers & Raghuram G. Rajan, 1998. "The Paradox of Liquidity," CRSP working papers 339, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
  4. Kevin Stiroh, 2006. "New Evidence on the Determinants of Bank Risk," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 237-263, December.
  5. Donald Morgan & Kevin Stiroh, 2001. "Market Discipline of Banks: The Asset Test," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 195-208, October.
  6. Beverly J. Hirtle, 2003. "What market risk capital reporting tells us about bank risk," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Sep, pages 37-54.
  7. Cumming, Christine & Hirtle, Beverly, 2001. "The challenges of risk management in diversified financial companies," Journal of Financial Transformation, Capco Institute, vol. 3, pages 89-95.
  8. Daniel M. Covitz & Diana Hancock & Myron L. Kwast, 2004. "A reconsideration of the risk sensitivity of U.S. banking organization subordinated debt spreads: a sample selection approach," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Sep, pages 73-92.
  9. Ursel Baumann & Erlend Nier, 2004. "Disclosure, volatility, and transparency: and empirical investigation into the value of bank disclosure," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Sep, pages 31-45.
  10. Julapa Jagtiani & George Kaufman & Catharine Lemieux, 2002. "The Effect of Credit Risk on Bank and Bank Holding Company Bond Yields: Evidence from the Post-FDICIA Period," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association & Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 25(4), pages 559-575.
  11. Simon H. Kwan, 2004. "Testing the strong-form of market discipline: the effects of public market signals on bank risk," Working Paper Series 2004-19, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
  12. Robert R. Bliss & Mark J. Flannery, 2000. "Market discipline in the governance of U.S. Bank Holding Companies: monitoring vs. influencing," Working Paper Series WP-00-3, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  13. Goyal, Vidhan K., 2005. "Market discipline of bank risk: Evidence from subordinated debt contracts," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 318-350, July.
  14. Jeremy Berkowitz & James O'Brien, 2002. "How Accurate Are Value-at-Risk Models at Commercial Banks?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(3), pages 1093-1111, 06.
  15. Donald P. Morgan, 2002. "Rating Banks: Risk and Uncertainty in an Opaque Industry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 874-888, September.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Frésard, Laurent & Pérignon, Christophe & Wilhelmsson, Anders, 2011. "The pernicious effects of contaminated data in risk management," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(10), pages 2569-2583, October.
  2. Pérignon, Christophe & Smith, Daniel R., 2010. "Diversification and Value-at-Risk," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 55-66, January.
  3. Pérignon, Christophe & Smith, Daniel R., 2010. "The level and quality of Value-at-Risk disclosure by commercial banks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 362-377, February.
  4. L. Baele & V. De Bruyckere & O. De Jonghe & R. Vander Vennet, 2012. "Do Stock Markets Discipline US Bank Holding Companies: Just Monitoring, or also In?uencing?," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium 12/827, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
  5. Höring, Dirk & Gründl, Helmut, 2011. "Investigating risk disclosure practices in the European insurance industry," ICIR Working Paper Series 02/11, International Center for Insurance Regulation (ICIR), Goethe University Frankfurt.
  6. Vander Vennet Rudi & De Jonghe Olivier & De Bruyckere Valerie & Baele Lieven, 2011. "Enhancing Bank Transparency: Risk Ineffciency as a Market Disciplining Mechanism," 2011 Meeting Papers 559, Society for Economic Dynamics.

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