This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

On the market discipline of informationally opaque firms: evidence from bank borrowers in the federal funds market

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Adam Ashcraft
Hoyt Bleakley

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Using plausibly exogenous variation in demand for federal funds created by daily shocks to reserve balances, we identify the supply curve facing a bank borrower in the interbank market and study how access to overnight credit is affected by changes in public and private measures of borrower creditworthiness. Although there is evidence that lenders respond to adverse changes in public information about credit quality by restricting access to the market in a fashion consistent with market discipline, there is also evidence that borrowers respond to adverse changes in private information about credit quality by increasing leverage so as to offset the future impact on earnings. While the responsiveness of investors to public information is comforting, we document evidence that suggests that banks are able to manage the real information content of these disclosures. In particular, public measures of loan portfolio performance have information about future loan charge-offs, but only in quarters when the bank is examined by supervisors. However, the loan supply curve is not any more sensitive to public disclosures about nonperforming loans in an exam quarter, suggesting that investors are unaware of this information management.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr257.html
File Format: text/html
File Function:
Download Restriction: no
File URL: http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr257.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of New York in its series Staff Reports with number 257.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fip:fednsr:257

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 33 Liberty Street, New York, NY 10045-0001
Email:
Web page: http://www.newyorkfed.org/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Email:
Web: http://www.ny.frb.org/rmaghome/staff_rp/

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Diane Rosenberger).

Related research
Keywords: Federal funds market (United States) ; Bank loans ; Credit;

Other versions of this item:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Furfine, Craig, 2003. "Standing Facilities and Interbank Borrowing: Evidence from the Federal Reserve's New Discount Window," International Finance, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 6(3), pages 329-47, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Furfine, Craig H, 2001. "Banks as Monitors of Other Banks: Evidence from the Overnight Federal Funds Market," Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 74(1), pages 33-57, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Park, Sangkyun & Peristiani, Stavros, 1998. "Market Discipline by Thrift Depositors," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 30(3), pages 347-64, August.
  4. Adam B. Ashcraft, 2001. "New evidence on the lending channel," Staff Reports 136, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. John, Kose & John, Teresa A. & Senbet, Lemma W., 1991. "Risk-shifting incentives of depository institutions: A new perspective on federal deposit insurance reform," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 15(4-5), pages 895-915, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Sangkyun Park & Stavros Peristiani, 2001. "Are bank shareholders enemies of regulators or a potential source of market discipline?," Staff Reports 138, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Donald P. Morgan & Kevin J. Stiroh, 1999. "Bond market discipline of banks: is the market tough enough?," Staff Reports 95, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. [Downloadable!]
  8. Kishan, Ruby P & Opiela, Timothy P, 2000. "Bank Size, Bank Capital, and the Bank Lending Channel," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 32(1), pages 121-41, February.
  9. Gorton, Gary & Santomero, Anthony M, 1990. "Market Discipline and Bank Subordinated Debt," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 22(1), pages 119-28, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Flannery, Mark J. & Kwan, Simon H. & Nimalendran, M., 2004. "Market evidence on the opaqueness of banking firms' assets," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(3), pages 419-460, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  11. Keeley, Michael C, 1990. "Deposit Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in Banking," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(5), pages 1183-1200, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. anonymous, 1999. "Using subordinated debt as an instrument of market discipline," Staff Studies 172, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
  13. Cook, Douglas O & Spellman, Lewis J, 1994. "Repudiation Risk and Restitution Costs: Toward Understanding Premiums on Insured Deposits," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 26(3), pages 439-59, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. DeYoung, Robert, et al, 2001. "The Information Content of Bank Exam Ratings and Subordinated Debt Prices," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 33(4), pages 900-925, November.
  15. Gunther, Jeffery W. & Moore, Robert R., 2003. "Loss underreporting and the auditing role of bank exams," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 153-177, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Heitor Almeida & Murillo Campello & Michael S. Weisbach, 2004. "The Cash Flow Sensitivity of Cash," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 59(4), pages 1777-1804, 08. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Flannery, Mark J, 1998. "Using Market Information in Prudential Bank Supervision: A Review of the U.S. Empirical Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 30(3), pages 273-305, August.
  18. Kashyap, Anil K. & Stein, Jeremy C., 1995. "The impact of monetary policy on bank balance sheets," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 151-195, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  19. Julapa Jagtiani & George Kaufman & Catharine Lemieux, 1999. "Do markets discipline banks and bank holding companies? evidence from debt pricing," Emerging Issues, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue Jun. [Downloadable!]
  20. Donald P. Morgan, 2002. "Rating Banks: Risk and Uncertainty in an Opaque Industry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 874-888, September. [Downloadable!]
  21. Hannan, Timothy H & Hanweck, Gerald A, 1988. "Bank Insolvency Risk and the Market for Large Certificates of Deposit," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 20(2), pages 203-11, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. François-Louis Michaud & Christian Upper, 2008. "What drives interbank rates? Evidence from the Libor panel," BIS Quarterly Review, Bank for International Settlements, March. [Downloadable!]
  2. Leonardo Bartolini & Spence Hilton & James McAndrews, 2008. "Settlement delays in the money market," Staff Reports 319, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS is not the only service displaying RePEc data. Choose on RePEc which service fits your needs best.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-18.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.