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Risk-shifting incentives of depository institutions: A new perspective on federal deposit insurance reform

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Author Info
John, Kose
John, Teresa A.
Senbet, Lemma W.
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Banking & Finance.

Volume (Year): 15 (1991)
Issue (Month): 4-5 (September)
Pages: 895-915
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:15:y:1991:i:4-5:p:895-915

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  1. Ting-Fang Chiang & E-Ching Wu & Min-Teh Yu, 2007. "Premium setting and bank behavior in a voluntary deposit insurance scheme," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 205-222, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Bruno Amable & Jean-Bernard Chatelain & Olivier De Bandt, 2002. "Optimal capacity in the banking sector and economic growth," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00112535_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Dailami, Mansoor & Hauswald, Robert, 2000. "Risk shifting and long-term contracts : evidence from the Ras Gas Project," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2469, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  4. Cull, Robert & Senbet, Lemma W. & Sorge, Marco, 2001. "Deposit insurance and financial development," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2682, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Ben Z. Schreiber, 1996. "The Owner-Manager Conflict in Insured Banks: Predetermined Salary vs. Bonus Payments," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 96-38, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
  6. Thomas H. Noe & Stephen D. Smith, 1997. "The buck stops where? The role of limited liability in economics," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, issue Q 1, pages 46-56. [Downloadable!]
  7. Paul H. Kupiec & James M. O'Brien, 1997. "The pre-commitment approach: using incentives to set market risk capital requirements," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 1997-14, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
  8. Edward S. Prescott, 2002. "Can risk-based deposit insurance premiums control moral hazard?," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Spr, pages 87-100. [Downloadable!]
  9. Arnold R. Cowan & Jann C. Howell & Mark L. Power, 2002. "Wealth Effects of Banks' Rights to Market and Originate Annuities," Finance 0203002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  10. Ben Schreiber, 1997. "The Owner–Manager Conflict in Insured Banks: Predetermined Salary versus Bonus Payments," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 303-326, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Paul H. Kupiec & James M. O'Brien, 1998. "Deposit insurance, bank incentives, and the design of regulatory policy," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Oct, pages 201-211. [Downloadable!]
  12. Adam Ashcraft & Hoyt Bleakley, 2006. "On the market discipline of informationally opaque firms: evidence from bank borrowers in the federal funds market," Staff Reports 257, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. [Downloadable!]
  13. David Marshall & Subu Venkataraman, 1997. "Bank capital standards for market risk: a welfare analysis," Working Paper Series, Issues in Financial Regulation WP-97-09, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
  14. Paul H. Kupiec & James M. O'Brien, 1997. "Deposit insurance, bank incentives, and the design of regulatory policy," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 1998-10, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
  15. Claudia M. Buch & Gayle L. DeLong, 2008. "Banking Globalization: International Consolidation and Mergers in Banking," IAW Discussion Papers 38, Institut für Angewandte Wirtschaftsforschung (IAW). [Downloadable!]
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